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INTRODUCTION 
At least nine drivers of taxicab, livery, and rideshare vehicles have 
committed suicide since November 2017, due to financial problems: 
Lu Wu (March 23, 2019);1 Roy Kim (November 5, 2018);2 Fausto 
Luna (September 26, 2018);3 Abdul Saleh (June 15, 2018);4 Yu Mein 
 
 1. Georgett Roberts & Amanda Woods, Lyft Driver Found Dead in Back of Car 
as Cabbie Suicide Epidemic Continues, N.Y. POST (Mar. 23, 2019, 4:45 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2019/03/23/cabbie-suicide-epidemic-continues-as-ninth-man-
found-dead-in-back-of-car/ [https://perma.cc/9JL4-PBY7]. 
 2. Danielle Furfaro & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Another NYC Cab Driver Deep in 
Debt Kills Himself, N.Y. POST (Nov. 14, 2018, 3:16 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2018/11/14/another-nyc-cab-driver-deep-in-debt-kills-himself/ 
[https://perma.cc/ARK7-PHWP]. 
 3. Id. At a vigil held in honor of the driver on October 7, 2018 the City’s Taxi & 
Limousine Commissioner Meera Joshi attended to pay her respects, but was chased 
away by cursing and shouting attendees, some of whom blamed her for the recent 
suicides.  Tyler Pager & Emily Palmer, Uber Driver’s Death Marks Seventh For-Hire 
Driver Suicide Within a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), 
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“Kenny” Chow (May 23, 2018);5 Nicanor Ochisor (March 16, 2018);6 
Doug Schifter (February 5, 2018);7 Danilo Corporan Castillo 
(December 20, 2017);8 and Alfredo Perez (November 2017).9  For 
over a year, the media has put a spotlight on these stories of suicides 
by drivers — primarily immigrants themselves — characterizing 
drivers’ increasing debt and depression as an epidemic,10 and adding 
immense pressure on local legislators and the Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (“TLC”) to take action and impose stringent regulations, 
like the temporary, one-year cap it set into motion last August. 
To some, the sharing economy is an innovative new world of 
possibilities, from a job creation point of view (to be your own boss, 
work when and how you want) and a user perspective (order a shared 
ride, live like a local during your vacation and forgo the hotel for a 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/nyregion/uber-driver-suicide-for-hire-taxis-new-
york.html [https://perma.cc/H49Y-VCA3]. 
 4. Danielle Furfaro, Another Cash-Strapped NYC Cabbie Commits Suicide, 
N.Y. POST (July 15, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/06/15/another-cash-
strapped-nyc-cabbie-commits-suicide/ [https://perma.cc/S94J-D94D]. 
 5. Nikita Stewart & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Another Taxi Driver in Debt Takes His 
Life. That’s 5 in 5 Months., N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/nyregion/taxi-driver-suicide-nyc.html 
[https://perma.cc/U3VF-2KJN]. 
 6. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Taxi Driver Took His Own Life. His Family 
Blames Uber’s Influence., N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/nyregion/a-taxi-driver-took-his-own-life-his-
family-blames-ubers-influence.html [https://perma.cc/C7BE-ZU8N]; Danielle 
Furfaro & Max Jaeger, Cabbie Blamed Uber, Lyft for Financial Woes Before 
Hanging Himself, N.Y. POST (Mar. 21, 2018, 3:20 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2018/03/21/cabbie-blamed-uber-lyft-for-financial-woes-before-
hanging-himself/ [https://perma.cc/9B3Q-H5V5]. 
 7. Jessica Bruder, Driven to Despair, N.Y. MAGAZINE (May 14, 2018), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/05/the-tragic-end-to-a-black-car-drivers-
campaign-against-uber.html [https://perma.cc/PYH6-3CBZ]; see also Doug Schifter, 
FACEBOOK (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1888367364808997&id=100009
072541151 [https://perma.cc/9DBH-M7AV]. 
 8. Dan Rivoli et al., Distraught Livery Driver Killed Himself Weeks Before 
Second City Hall Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018, 9:33 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/distraught-driver-killed-weeks-city-hall-
suicide-article-1.3803684 [https://perma.cc/NN2J-XU55]. 
 9. Henry Goldman, Suicides, Traffic Hell in NYC Spur Second Look at Uber’s 
Growth, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-18/suicides-traffic-hell-in-nyc-spur-
second-look-at-uber-s-growth [https://perma.cc/2N4L-UUMS ]. 
 10. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Suicides Get Taxi Drivers Talking: ‘I’m Going to Be 
One of Them’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/nyregion/suicides-taxi-drivers-nyc.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y9G2-7DNT]. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 945 
chic apartment).  To others, the sharing economy provides the same 
services we have always had — just transacted through an app — and 
is, therefore, something to control and integrate into the existing 
governance and structural systems currently in place (as opposed to 
creating new, dynamic laws). 
Uber is one of the most polarizing phenomenon in the sharing 
economy.  Uber’s informal, accessible app-based system of ordering a 
private car has rocked the taxi industry from New York to London.  
Flipping even the traditional structure of entrepreneurship on its 
head, the gig revolution and rideshare industry’s success in New York 
City (the “City”) creates extra costs, including slower traffic speeds, 
worsening traffic congestion, and increased competition for taxi and 
livery drivers (who are heavily regulated and capped by a draconian 
“medallion” system11). 
There are two competing interests at play: one, the economic needs 
of all professional drivers, taxi, and rideshare alike; and, two, the 
problem of race-based refusals that have historically plagued 
residents living deep into Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx.  More 
and more outer borough residents rely heavily upon Uber and other 
rideshare companies like it.  But now the New York City Council is 
attempting to limit the number of rideshare vehicles on the streets of 
New York.  Called a “ban first, study later” approach by Uber, the 
City Council’s new legislation — Introduction No. 144-B (“Int. No. 
144-B”) — was passed into law in August 2018, halting the issuance of 
for-license vehicles for one year.12 With New York’s one-year cap 
now set to expire in August of this year, the nation’s largest cities are 
watching what the mayor, city legislators, and the TLC will do next. 
As part of a package of bills intended to strictly regulate app-based 
rideshares, relieve congestion, and increase driver pay, the 
moratorium — especially if it should become permanent — is 
ultimately a non-evidence-based solution that will hurt the lower-
income, minority communities in the outer boroughs of New York 
City. 
 
 11. Sam Harnett, Cities Made Millions Selling Taxi Medallions, Now Drivers Are 
Paying the Price, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:28 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/656595597/cities-made-millions-selling-taxi-
medallions-now-drivers-are-paying-the-price [https://perma.cc/WRK4-V89B]. 
 12. See Complaint at 2, Zehn-NY LLC v. City of New York, No. 151730/2019 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2019). See generally N.Y.C. Council, Introduction No. 144-B 
(enacted August 14, 2018) [hereinafter Int. No. 144-B]; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-
502(hh) (2019); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-550 (2019). 
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Part I of this Note traverses the transportation landscape, from why 
the differences between rideshares and yellow cabs justify varying 
regulatory schemes, to patterns of rideshare growth.  It also examines 
the empirical data supporting the notion that a blanket cap on 
rideshares hurts outer-borough communities, low-income residents, 
and minorities the most.  Part II analyzes the constitutionality of the 
new law, exploring ways transit advocates can invoke possible civil 
rights arguments against such a regulatory cap.  It also acknowledges 
the possibility that a law granting authority to the TLC to limit the 
number of rideshare vehicle licenses is preempted.  Ultimately, this 
Part concludes that there are several underlying policy assertions for 
why, even if these claims are unsuccessful under federal or state 
statutes, neither the City Council nor the TLC should implement a 
permanent cap.  Finally, Part III proposes alternative ways of 
thinking about rideshare regulation, recommendations (like 
congestion pricing), and ultimately embraces rideshares as an 
innovative transit alternative. 
I. THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSPORTATION LANDSCAPE IN 2018 
Part I examines New York City’s new local law capping rideshare 
vehicle licenses for one year and the transportation landscape as a 
result of the rapid growth of rideshares in the last several years.  
Section I.A. looks in particular at Int. No. 144-B and the events 
leading to its passage.  Section I.B. discusses the differences between 
rideshare regulation and the taxi medallion administration.  It also 
inspects the overlooked bus system, green cabs, and commuter vans.  
Section I.C. surveys the empirical data supporting the perspective 
that, because demand for rideshares in the outer boroughs in 
particular is significant and growing, rideshares are an important 
service on which low-income, minority communities rely.  Lastly, 
Section I.D. considers the effect of rideshares on all five boroughs in 
general. 
A. New York City’s New Local Laws: Background 
On August 8, 2018, the New York City Council (“City Council”) 
passed a one-year moratorium on the issuance of new licenses for 
rideshare vehicles.  This is the first time a major U.S. city has enacted 
a law to limit the number of rideshares,13 also known as “for-hire 
 
 13. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit With Cap as New York City Takes Lead in 
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html 
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vehicles” (“FHVs”).14  The City’s new law is one of the strongest laws 
attempting to regulate Uber, Lyft, and other transportation network 
companies (“TNCs”) in the country.  During this one-year ban, the 
City says it will study the effect of for-hire vehicles in the city in order 
to evaluate future rideshare regulation and whether to make the cap 
on rideshare vehicle issuances permanent.15  Thirty-nine Council 
members voted in favor of the cap, while six voted against it.16  In 
 
[https://perma.cc/ZN4F-GVFG] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap].  The 
new bill does not prohibit the issuance of licenses for wheelchair-accessible vehicles. 
Id. 
 14. In this Note, the term “rideshare” is used to refer to services provided by TNC 
companies like Uber and Lyft, but they are also often colloquially called “ride-hails.”  
In New York, rideshares are regulated as part of the for-hire industry (and thus, may 
also be called for-hire vehicles, or “FHVs”). See infra note 21 and accompanying text.  
Furthermore, rideshare companies may, in general, be called a “transportation 
network company” (“TNC”), originating from a 2013 California Public Utilities 
Commission ruling, which officially defined these services as TNCs. See Tomio 
Geron, California Becomes First State to Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft, 
Sidecar, UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-to-
regulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx/#7ec7b7001804 
[https://perma.cc/AX8G-E68F]. 
 15. See Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap, supra note 13. 
 16. The six members who voted against the new law were three Democrats (Inez 
Barron, 42nd district; Robert Cornegy, 36th district; and Mark Gjonaj, 13th district) 
and three Republicans (Joseph Borelli, 51st district; Eric Ulrich, 32nd district; and 
Steven Matteo, 50th district). City Council, City of New York, Transcript of the 
Minutes of the Council Stated Meeting 47–51, 56–122 (Aug. 8, 2018) [hereinafter 
Transcript of the Minutes]. Explaining his vote, Ulrich said that his borough of 
Queens was home to many transportation deserts that “don’t have the luxury . . . of 
having multiple subway lines beneath our feet and adequate bus service,” and that 
yellow cabs, while “nostalgic,” were, 
a declining industry with an outdated business model, and by placing the cap 
on new licenses for for-hire vehicles, that would be the equivalent of the 
City Council deciding that we’re going to put a cap on Netflix subscription 
because we’re worried about Blockbusters that are closing. Technology 
changes. Society changes. The economy changes. This is a free market and 
we have to be able to move with the market. The fact that we’re now 
capping for one year instead of waiting for this study to come back, we’re 
also going to be limiting thousands of New Yorkers from bringing in extra 
income that they work hard for that they need to sustain themselves and to 
support their families. 
Id. at 110–11.  Similarly, Barron said in her community of Brooklyn, 
from the time that I was little many years ago, we did not see yellow cabs 
unless we were coming from the airport and you got a yellow taxi to bring 
you home. So from that need, the ingenuity and the resourcefulness of 
people led to the cabs that you could call. You put in a call, they would 
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addition, the new law permitted New York to set a minimum pay rate 
for rideshare drivers — also the first in the country.17  Calling the 
growth of app-based, for-hire vehicles a “crisis,”18 Mayor Bill de 
Blasio signed the bill into law, adding that the new laws are part of his 
broader efforts to combat income inequality.19 
 
come and pick you up. And now it has expanded to where we have the app 
hails and people get service in that way.  This industry that has expanded 
has provided a great service, and I think that perhaps if a study had been 
done prior to the legislation, we would see what it is in fact we needed to do 
to bring some equity to the situation. I think that my community will be 
hindered, suffer, and not have services that they need with this. 
Id. at 78–79.  Finally, Gjonaj remarked that the cap does not adequately consider 
rideshare drivers working part-time or as an additional source of income. Id. at 84–85. 
 17. Id.; see also Peter Holley, New Rules Guarantee Minimum Wage for NYC 
Uber, Lyft Drivers, WASH. POST BLOGS (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/04/new-rules-guarantee-
minimum-wage-nyc-uber-lyft-drivers/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/5KPD-6GPU] 
(noting that the new pay floor for rideshare drivers is set at $17.22 per hour to bring 
the minimum pay in line with the City’s $15.00 per hour minimum wage for typical 
employees — with the extra $2.22 accounting for contract drivers’ payroll taxes and 
paid time off).  On December 4, 2018, the TLC voted to adopt the minimum pay rate 
for app-based drivers, which went into effect on December 31, 2018. Id.  Because 
rideshare drivers are considered independent contractors rather than employees, they 
are not subject to the standard minimum wage laws. Id.; Mallory Locklear, NYC 
Passes Minimum Pay Wage for Uber and Lyft Drivers, ENGADGET (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.engadget.com/2018/12/04/nyc-minimum-pay-wage-uber-lyft-drivers/ 
[https://perma.cc/ANY8-RX8P].  A study by the TLC recommended a $17.22 hourly 
minimum wage after expenses to cover paid time off and the costs of owning and 
driving a car in the City.  James A. Parrott & Michael Reich, An Earnings Standard 
for New York City’s App-Based Drivers: Economic Analysis and Policy Assessment, 
CTR. N.Y.C. AFFAIRS (July 2018), http://www.centernyc.org/an-earnings-standard 
[https://perma.cc/938Y-YLLN]; see Faiz Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes 
First-in-the-Nation Cap on Uber and Lyft, WASH. POST BLOGS (Aug. 8. 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/08/08/new-york-city-
council-votes-to-cap-uber-and-lyft/?utm_term=.b7a1dbecab78 
[https://perma.cc/S3VD-ND7K] [hereinafter Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes 
First-in-the-Nation Cap].  The Independent Drivers Guild reports that app-based 
drivers currently earn about $11.90 an hour. NYC Sets Nation’s First Minimum Wage 
for App-Based Drivers, INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://drivingguild.org/2018/12/04/nyc-sets-nations-first-minimum-wage-for-app-
based-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/Y6AQ-RUWL]. 
 18. Mayor Bill de Blasio (@NYCMayor), TWITTER (Aug. 8, 2018, 1:24 PM), 
https://twitter.com/NYCMayor/status/1027289516145557505 [https://perma.cc/AT95-
PGNM]; see Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes First-in-the-Nation Cap, supra 
note 17. 
 19. Henry Goldman, NYC Is Set to Impose A Cap on Uber, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 
6, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-06/nyc-set-to-
impose-cap-on-uber-as-ride-hail-vehicles-clog-streets [https://perma.cc/L4F7-24VX]. 
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1. Four Years in the Making 
New York City Council’s initiative to cap Uber began in 2015.20  
While Uber started operating in New York City in 2011, by 2015, the 
number of FHVs21 grew by more than 60%,22 or to over 63,000.23  
About 20,000 of those 63,000 for-hire vehicles were affiliated with 
Uber, according to the TLC.24  At the time, the number of vehicles 
associated with Uber were growing at a rate of 3% per month.25  
Mayor de Blasio, citing the worsening Manhattan traffic congestion, 
proposed placing “a cap on Uber’s growth, pending a study of traffic 
patterns.”26  Uber launched an aggressive anti-cap ad campaign, 
replete with criticism of de Blasio.27  Before it ever reached a Council 
 
 20. See Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio Administration Dropping Plan for Uber 
Cap, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/de-blasio-administration-dropping-
plan-for-uber-cap-for-now.html [https://perma.cc/SKV3-XL3D]; Issie Lapowsky, 
Uber Wins Its Battle Against NYC’s Mayor—For Now, WIRED (July 22, 2015, 5:25 
PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-wins-battle-nyc-mayor-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/EAP9-NW2D]. 
 21. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-502 (2019).  A “for-hire vehicle” is defined as: “a 
motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire in the city, with a seating capacity of 
twenty passengers or less, not including the driver, other than a taxicab, coach, 
wheelchair accessible van, commuter van or an authorized bus operating pursuant to 
applicable provisions of law . . . .” Id.  Furthermore, as of August 14, 2018, “[h]igh-
volume for-hire service” has been added to the Code to mean: 
[A]n individual, partnership, limited liability company, business 
corporation, sole proprietorship . . . operating under, or in affiliation with, 
one brand or trade name . . . that offers, facilitates or otherwise connects 
passengers to for-hire vehicles by prearrangement, including through one or 
more licensed black car bases, luxury limousine bases, or livery base 
stations . . . utilizing software that allows a passenger or prospective 
passenger to arrange for transportation using a passenger-facing booking 
tool, including a smartphone or other electronic device, and that dispatches, 
or facilitates the dispatching of, 10,000 or more trips in the city in one 
day . . . . 
Id. 
 22. Matt Flegenheimer & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in 
Struggle Over New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/nyregion/city-hall-and-uber-clash-in-struggle-
over-new-york-streets.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R665-FSVF]. 
 23. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Flegenheimer & Fitzsimmons, supra note 22. 
 27. See Issie Lapowsky, Uber’s New Fake Feature in NYC Derides Regulators, 
WIRED (July 15, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-de-blasio/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PYA-VF3J ].  In July 2015, Uber added the “de Blasio” feature to 
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vote, de Blasio agreed to drop his plan to cap the number of Uber and 
ridesharing vehicles operating in New York City, much to the dismay 
of taxi drivers and medallion-holders.28  Instead, the company and the 
City struck an agreement: The City would conduct a four-month 
study on the effects of rideshare growth on New York City traffic, and 
Uber would be required to “release a trove of data the city had been 
seeking for its analysis”29 of traffic patterns and rideshare growth, 
which the company reluctantly shared in exchange for avoiding the 
moratorium.30  The New York City Charter was thereafter amended 
to reflect the occurrence of this study.31  However, City officials 
warned a restriction similar to the proposed cap “remained a 
possibility down the line.”32 
Uber’s proliferation today, compared to its growth in 2015, 
continues to be significant.  In 2018, there were 80,000 FHVs in New 
York City associated with ride-hailing apps.33  Approximately 65,000 
of those vehicles were affiliated with Uber34 — making it Uber’s 
 
its app, available only to New York City riders, as part of its ad campaign opposing a 
cap.  Using this function, the map showed zero available cars — or a car twenty-five 
minutes away — followed by the message, “[t]his is what Uber will look like in NYC 
if Mayor de Blasio’s Uber cap bill passes.” Id.  Coupled with local television 
commercials featuring drivers calling on people to oppose the cap, Uber’s ad 
campaign further criticized Mayor de Blasio, depicting him “as a protector of the 
yellow taxi industry, whose leaders have been significant campaign contributors to 
the mayor.”  See Flegenheimer, supra note 20; Uber, Integration on Moleskine 
Timepage, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/embed/xFOQ6ID6lvk 
[https://perma.cc/GY98-BCRE]. 
 28. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20; Lapowsky, supra note 27. 
 29. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20. 
 30. Id. 
 31. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2303. 
 32. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20. 
 33. Jeffrey C. Mays, 3 Years Ago, Uber Beat Back a Cap on Vehicles. What’s 
Changed? A Lot, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/uber-cap-nyc-decision-strategy.html 
[https://perma.cc/FJR5-TZVW].  In New York City, there are a variety of on-demand 
rideshare apps connecting users to private for-hire vehicles, including Uber, Lyft, 
Via, and Juno. See Kailla Coomes, The Best Ridesharing Apps for 2019, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (July 1, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-ride-sharing-apps/ 
[https://perma.cc/F63Y-SBJX].  Alternatively, Gett, Curb, and Arro are app-based 
services booking riders with yellow and green cabs and other established taxi 
operators. Id. 
 34. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling. So Are 
Uber Drivers., N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/nyregion/uber-taxi-drivers-struggle.html 
[https://perma.cc/W6G7-R6R8] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York 
Are Struggling]; see also Paul Berger & Greg Bensinger, New York Plans to Cap 
Uber and Lyft, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
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largest market in the United States.35  Ubers provide more than 
400,000 trips a day, while Lyft accounts for 112,000 trips a day.36  
Furthermore, it is likely that the number of FHVs operating in New 
York City will continue to grow.  To date, the TLC has issued a total 
of 130,000 licenses to FHVs37 and since May 2016, an average of 1700 
new FHVs “have become active every month.”38  By contrast, New 
York City taxicabs, which are capped at 13,587 licensed drivers, have 
expanded in fleet number little since the 1930s and provide 300,00039 
trips a day.40 
2. Attack on Tech for the Sake of . . . Attacking Tech? 
The City Council cited a number of factors as justification for the 
one-year cap on rideshares and minimum wage floor: increased 
protection for drivers (both of rideshares and taxis);41 mitigation of 
traffic congestion in Manhattan’s central business district; regulation 
of the otherwise unrestricted growth of the booming rideshare 
industry because this growth is unsustainable;42 and address of the 
growing environmental concerns stemming from the rideshare 
economy’s rapid proliferation.43 
 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-council-votes-to-cap-uber-and-lyft-
1533759263 [https://perma.cc/W6G7-R6R8] (noting that ride-hail vehicles — like 
Uber and Lyft — numbered 25,000 in 2015, while in 2018, there were about 80,000). 
 35. See Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap, supra note 13. 
 36. See Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling, supra note 34.  
According to experts, if Uber’s drivers were classified as employees rather than 
independent contractors, Uber would be New York City’s number one private for-
profit employer. See Holley, supra note 17. 
 37. See generally N.Y.C. Council, Committee on For-Hire Vehicles, PROPOSED 
INT. NO. 144-B, at 7 (Aug. 8, 2018) 
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3331789&GUID=6647E63
0-2992-461F-B3E3-F5103DED0653&Options=&Search= [https://perma.cc/N2UW-
95ZX] [hereinafter Committee Report 8/8/18].  Note that licenses for vehicles, drivers 
themselves, and bases are issued separately. FAQ for TNC Drivers, DEP’T MOTOR 
VEHICLES, https://dmv.ny.gov/more-info/faq-tnc-drivers [https://perma.cc/VQ2F-
TKP5]. 
 38. See Committee Report 8/8/18, supra note 37, at 9. 
 39. See Holley, supra note 17. 
 40. NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 8 
(2017). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Goldman, supra note 19; Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes First-in-
the-Nation Cap, supra note 17. 
 43. See Goldman, supra note 19; Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes First-in-
the-Nation Cap, supra note 17. 
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Many council members acknowledged the serious, legitimate 
concern that discrimination and racism has led to communities of 
color being denied access to taxis, that transit deserts were indeed a 
serious problem that needs addressing, and that rideshares were 
indeed filling a gap in transit access.44  A strong majority nevertheless 
voted in favor of the package of bills that included a cap and 
minimum wage because it included a broad exemption for 
wheelchair-accessible vehicles and would create of the Office of 
Inclusion at the TLC to examine discrimination.45 
The City’s exertion of control over rideshare economy sent a 
strong message to the tech industry.46  New York City’s move to curb 
the growth of rideshares could inspire other major cities nationwide 
to impose similar regulations.47  The new regulatory strategy is a blow 
to Uber, which had a projected valuation of $120 billion in early 
2019,48 and after months of anticipation, went public on May 10, 2019 
at the disappointingly low price of $45 per share (valuing the 
company at about $75.46 billion).49  Similarly, it will heavily impact 
 
 44. See, e.g., City Council of New York Hearing Transcript 102–04, 110 (Aug. 8, 
2018). 
 45. See Transcript of the Minutes, supra note 16, at 47, 77; William Neuman, New 
York Office to Address Discrimination by Taxis and For-Hire Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/nyregion/uber-taxis-minorities-
bias-refusal-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/6T73-AJDP]. 
 46. See generally Transcript of the Minutes, supra note 16.  Indeed, many Council 
members noted that this bill was intended to send a message to billion-dollar tech 
companies. Id. at 98.  Richards, who voted yes, said he was “proud to be part of a 
body led by Speaker Johnson that is sending a message to billion dollar companies 
that have aggressively waged a public campaign against raising standards for their 
own drivers and regulations that would reign in the oversaturation of their cars on 
our city streets that have added to an ever-growing congestion problem.  In New 
York City, there should be one set of rules for everyone, and no corporation should 
feel that they are entitled to a monopoly at the expense of people’s lives.” Id. at 98. 
 47. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap, supra note 13; see also Owain James, Uber 
and Lyft Are Lobbying States to Prohibit Local Regulation, MOBILITYLAB (July 24, 
2018), https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-and-lyft-are-lobbying-states-to-
prohibit-local-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/YQ75-5ZN5]. 
 48. Liz Hoffman et al., Uber Proposals Value Company at $120 Billion in a 
Possible IPO, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2018, 1:28 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-proposals-value-company-at-120-billion-in-a-
possible-ipo-1539690343 [https://perma.cc/5HJ3-RAZF] (basing the estimated, pre-
IPO valuation off of proposals from Wall Street banks).  
 49. Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Goes Public: Everything You Need to Know 
About the Biggest Tech IPO in Years, VERGE (May 10, 2019, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/10/18564197/uber-ipo-stock-valuation-pricing-fares-
drivers-public-market [https://perma.cc/K2WP-XF53]. In its first earnings report since 
listing its shares on the stock market, Uber reported losses of more than $1 billion for 
the quarter (compared to profit a year ago resulting from divestures), while revenues 
rose twenty percent to $3.1 billion, which is “slower than the 25 percent annual 
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Lyft, which became the first ridesharing company to go public on 
March 29, 2019, and is now valued at $27 billion.50 
But in terms of any practical ramifications for the cap — for 
example, mitigating congestion in Manhattan — whether a cap on 
rideshares will be actually effective is questionable.51  Manhattan’s 
traffic congestion problems existed long before Uber and Lyft’s 
appearance,52 and as a regulatory strategy meant to decongest traffic, 
transportation experts say that citywide cap on for-hire vehicles is 
suboptimal with “questionable efficacy.”53  And, as previously 
mentioned, there are alarming externalities, which council members 
explicitly acknowledged during the hearing, that should make such a 
regulatory strategy unjustified. 
Finally, there is uncertainty regarding whether a cap on for-hire 
vehicles, provided by private tech companies, is legally justifiable.  
Ubers, to put it simply, are not taxis.  The services, while comparable, 
are not the same, and conflating the two from a regulatory standpoint 
has little basis in the law, however little law there is about this 
burgeoning industry. 
Today, New York City is home to over 8.5 million people and 4.4 
million daily commuters in its five boroughs (Manhattan, Brooklyn, 
Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island).54  The City has welcomed 
300,000 residents, 700,000 jobs, and 16 million tourists in the last 
decade.55  Meanwhile, growth, or at least improvement, of transit, has 
 
growth it had recorded in the prior quarter” — which is “the company’s lowest 
quarterly growth rate since it began disclosing its results in 2017.” Kate Conger, 
Uber’s First Earnings Report After I.P.O.: $1 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/technology/uber-stock-earnings.html 
[https://perma.cc/KF9T-BGNG].  
 50. Kate Conger & Michael J. de la Merced, Lyft’s Shares Jump in Trading 
Debut, Cementing Rise of the Gig Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/technology/lyft-stock-price.html 
[https://perma.cc/VP5Y-W6AU]. 
 51. See NICK SIFUENTES & LIAM BLANK, HIRE CONGESTION, LOWER SPEEDS: IS IT 
TIME TO CAP FOR-HIRE VEHICLES? 4 (2018), http://www.tstc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Hire-Congestion.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8PH-AV83] 
[hereinafter HIRE CONGESTION] (“An overly-aggressive citywide cap on FHVs would 
not only reduce availability in lower-income communities; it would potentially 
depress revenues from the congestion surcharge as well, thereby impacting funding 
for transit.”). 
 52. Id. at 5. 
 53. Id. at 4, 6. 
 54. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, THE OTHER 
TRANSIT CRISIS: HOW TO IMPROVE THE NYC BUS SYSTEM 9 (2017), 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-other-transit-crisis-how-to-improve-the-nyc-
bus-system/ [https://perma.cc/ABJ9-CQF7]. 
 55. Id. 
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been less than proportional to the increase of people relying on 
transportation.  Of the various ways people — inhabitants and 
tourists alike — traverse around the City, buses are not reaching their 
maximum potential56 and subways are increasingly failing.57  In their 
places, Uber has filled the gap for many residents.58 
3. Uber’s Response to the City’s One-Year Ban 
On February 25, 2019, Uber filed a lawsuit against the City of New 
York.  Their complaint alleges, among other things, that Int. No. 144-
B, in delegating to the TLC permanent FHV capping power, exceeds 
the City Council’s power, was imposed without first studying what 
effect FHVs have on congestion, and is ultimately preempted by 
other interconnected regulatory measures put forth by the State of 
New York in 2018.59 
According to City Clerk records, Uber, Lyft, and other rideshare 
companies reportedly spent over $1 million lobbying the de Blasio 
administration to scale back rideshare regulations between January 
and June 2018 — 70% more than what they spent lobbying the city in 
2017 alone.60  Their recent efforts fighting the temporary moratorium 
may not have been a success, especially in comparison to their fierce, 
successful challenge of the same cap back in 2015.  But these 
companies are certainly not done putting up a fight, and their 
concern‚ however self-interested, does shine a light on the fact that a 
cap as a regulatory strategy is problematic. 
Uber may be a private company concerned with protecting their 
bottom line.  But as earnest critics of the one-year cap, they — 
alongside transit and civil rights advocates — argue that the 
communities that will be hit the hardest by a cap on rideshare vehicles 
are those in the outer boroughs of New York City, which tend to be 
low-income, minority communities.61  Certainly, research shows that 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, They Vowed to Fix the Subway a Year Ago. On-Time 
Rates Are Still Terrible., N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/nyregion/nyc-subway-delays-failure.html 
[https://perma.cc/93L9-JC65]. 
 58. See infra Section I.C.3. 
 59. See generally Complaint, Zehn-NY LLC v. City of New York, No. 
151730/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2019). 
 60. Anna Sanders, Ride-Sharing Companies Spent over $1M Lobbying in NYC, 
N.Y. POST (Aug. 4, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/08/04/ride-sharing-
companies-spent-over-1m-lobbying-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/JR68-7PPW]. 
 61. Id. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955 
rideshares serve a higher proportion of low-income neighborhoods 
than yellow cabs.62 
Residents in the outer boroughs (areas that tend to be considered 
“transit deserts”)63 lack accessible public transit options, endure poor 
bus service that is infrequent and overcrowded,64 and are underserved 
by traditional taxi services65 — despite the City’s attempts to remedy 
this underservice by implementing green taxis in 2015.  Uber 
considers their service a remedy to this ongoing problem.  An Uber 
ride may not be a commuter’s first choice, but sometimes it may be 
their only option when the bus does not show up or subway service is 
down. 
B. Regulating Rideshares Alongside the Taxi Medallion Regime 
1. Aren’t Ubers Just Taxis? 
For-hire vehicles, such as Ubers, Lyfts, and the like, are currently 
subject to a different set of regulations than yellow taxis due to a few 
crucial differences.66  Mainly, yellow taxis have been regulated by a 
medallion regime since the 1930s, which gives them a monopoly over 
picking up passengers from street hailing.67  But because yellow taxis 
are the only vehicles permitted to pick up street-hail passengers, they 
are subject to more stringent regulation as opposed to FHVs, which 
may only serve customers who have made a phone call, or called for 
the car via a smartphone app (which, in the latter case, would also 
require them to have a credit card, and share specific information like 
pick-up and drop-off locations).68 
In justifying the distinction between medallion taxicabs from 
FHVs, the Second Circuit noted that the different circumstances by 
 
 62. See generally HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51. 
 63. See infra Section I.C. 
 64. Amy Yensi, Soundview Residents Say Bronx Neighborhood Is Transit Desert, 
NY1 (Sept. 9, 2018, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/bronx/news/2018/09/09/soundview-residents-say-bronx-
neighborhood-is-transit-desert- [https://perma.cc/W44L-WDTL].  Bus rider Sharon 
Nelson commented, “If you’re waiting a long time that throws you off for the 
connecting bus.  I check the transit app and if it’s too long, I take an Uber.  I don’t 
always want to have to take an Uber.  Thank God it’s here right now.” Id. 
 65. Shoshana Wodinsky, In Major Defeat for Uber and Lyft, New York City 
Votes to Limit Ride-Hailing Cars, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2018, 4:39 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/8/17661374/uber-lyft-nyc-cap-vote-city-council-new-
york-taxi [https://perma.cc/57WU-7WPE]. 
 66. See Committee Report 8/8/18, supra note 37, at 4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
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which these services obtain riders have resulted in certain regulations 
on medallion taxicabs by the TLC that are not appropriate for FHVs: 
[Taxis have] . . . vehicle attributes, such as a distinctive yellow color, 
overhead lights, air conditioning, and a uniform rate structure.  
These regulations conceivably promote safety, convenience, easy 
identification, comfort, and uniformity of service for customers who 
hail a taxicab on the street and have had no prior dealings with the 
driver or the taxicab company.  Moreover, other regulations, such as 
the requirement of a partition between a driver and a passenger or 
an emergency warning light, may promote driver safety when 
picking up customers who have no prior relationship with the 
taxicab company.69 
Furthermore, taxis are frequently understood to be part of the 
“common carrier system,”70 and thus subject to limited entry, rate 
regulation, and universal service obligations.71  Uber may have 
hastened the demise of the taxi industry by upending the financial 
security that a taxi medallion provided,72 but the business of driving a 
taxi was strained even before the growth and proliferation of FHVs 
by way of its strict regulation and uncompromising numerical cap.  
Although New York City first issued taxi medallions in 1937, it took 
nearly sixty years before New York started to release any new 
medallions.73  In 1996, the City held the first auction for 1800 new 
medallions.74  The most recent medallion auction was held in 2014; 
 
 69. Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 50 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(upholding the “TLC’s decision to impose increased accessibility fleet requirements 
on medallion taxicabs and not also on FHVs [because it] rationally serves the City’s 
legitimate object of making it easier for disabled persons to obtain transportation via 
street hail”). 
 70. James B. Speta, Southwest Airlines, MCI, and Now Uber: Lessons for 
Managing Competitive Entry into Taxi Markets, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 101, 114 (2016) 
(noting that according to the Supreme Court, a taxi’s “status as a common carrier 
depends on how they operate; if taxicabs serve the public generally, they were 
considered common carriers”) (citing Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 
255–56 (1916)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Winnie Hu, Taxi Medallions, Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners Into 
Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/nyregion/new-york-taxi-medallions-uber.html 
[https://perma.cc/MSS6-DGN9] (“Taxi ownership once seemed a guaranteed route to 
financial security, something that was more tangible and reliable than the stock 
market since people hailed cabs in good times and bad.”). 
 73. Jeff Horwitz & Chris Cumming, Taken for a Ride, SLATE: MONEYBOX (June 
6, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://slate.com/business/2012/06/taxi-medallions-how-new-yorks-
terrible-taxi-system-makes-fares-higher-and-drivers-poorer.html 
[https://perma.cc/22EG-P4XQ]. 
 74. See Hu, supra note 72. 
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350 new medallions were sold, generating $359 million in revenue.75  
Today, by law, there are a total of 13,587 taxi medallions.76 
There are positive aspects to having a medallion system for taxis, in 
that the numerical cap, in theory, regulates the proportion of cabs per 
people and it may provide equity to taxi owners.77  However, these 
stringent regulations have created a crisis for the medallion regime, in 
that it is financially incompatible with rideshare competition for its 
drivers.  In 1979, taxi drivers also became “independent contractors” 
under federal labor laws when the TLC modified its rules to allow 
medallions to be leased out for twelve-hour shifts.78  The need to 
make daily lease payments to operate a medallion chipped away at 
the economic value of driving a taxi, and this business model 
continues in full force today.79  For example, in 2012, less than 20% of 
taxis were owner-operated, meaning taxi fleets or brokers who rent 
taxis out to drivers own the majority of medallions.80 
The rise of FHVs has caused a massive plummet in the value of taxi 
medallions and placed significant economic strain on one of New 
York City’s largest working-class populations.81  While the medallion 
used to steadily rise in value, after reaching a record-high price of $1.3 
million in 2014, medallions are now selling for a fraction of that price 
(falling to around $160,000).82  In fact, because of the rise of FHVs, 
many medallions are worth far less than what their owners borrowed 
to buy them.83  Taxi cab owners, struggling to pay back the loans they 
took out to purchase their medallion, no longer have what was once 
considered a guaranteed “retirement fund.”84  Between 2015 to 2017, 
eighty-five medallions were sold as part of foreclosure proceedings, 
according to city records.85 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Get a Vehicle License, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/vehicles/get-a-vehicle-license.page 
[https://perma.cc/8W92-XMQZ]; Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are 
Struggling, supra note 34. 
 77. See Harnett, supra note 11. 
 78. See id.; Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 73. 
 79. See Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 73 (commenting that rising gas prices or 
traffic jams could deeply impact a driver’s daily wage since they still had to break 
even and afford the daily lease payment). 
 80. See Harnett, supra note 11; id. 
 81. See Harnett, supra note 11. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 73. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  In August 2017 alone, twelve of the twenty-one medallions sold were done 
so as part of foreclosure, with sales prices ranging from $150,000 to $450,000.  Id. 
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2. What Are Green Taxis? 
The green taxi business, a relatively new player itself to the City’s 
transportation landscape, has likewise been impacted by FHVs before 
it ever had the chance to take off.86  Green cabs were implemented in 
2013 — just around the time FHVs began picking up speed and when 
the value of a medallion reached a high of over $1 million.87  Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg originally devised the plan (the “HAIL Plan”) in 
201188 to create a new fleet of so-called borough taxis to “bring safe, 
reliable taxi service to the 4½ boroughs that don’t currently have it.”89  
At the time, a survey conducted by the taxi commission revealed that 
95% of yellow taxis picked up passengers below 96th Street in 
Manhattan and at the airports.90  Green taxis were to be 
geographically restricted to above East 96th and West 110th streets in 
Manhattan, and the outer boroughs (except for two airports in 
Queens: LaGuardia and JFK) — areas that are traditionally 
underserved by yellow cabs. 
Today, there are an estimated 3500 green taxis on the road in New 
York City.91  While green taxis were theoretically intended to operate 
as yellow taxis do, in reality, their geographical restrictions have 
 
 86. James Barron, Where Yellow Cabs Didn’t Go, Green Cabs Were Supposed to 
Thrive. Then Came Uber., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/nyregion/green-cabs-yellow-uber.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XTL-VJ59]. 
 87. Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 78–79; see Ted Mann, Mayor’s Taxi Plan Gets Green Light; Appeals 
Court Upholds Plan to Allow New Street-Hail Livery Cabs, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 
2013, 8:50 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324798904578529600046666448 
[https://perma.cc/Y4SU-7945]. 
 88. Dana Rubinstein, Bloomberg’s Radical Proposal to Solve New York City’s 
Taxi Problem, Stalled, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2011, 11:07 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2011/10/bloombergs-radical-
proposal-to-solve-new-york-citys-taxi-problem-stalled-000222 
[https://perma.cc/4ZQG-R86Z].  After the HAIL Plan was passed by legislative 
initiative in Albany, thereby bypassing City Council, the District Court ruled it 
unconstitutional as a violation of New York’s Home Rule provision and New York’s 
State Constitution.  Taxicab Serv. Ass’n v. State, No. 102553-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 21, 2012), rev’d in part by Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 21 N.Y.3d 289 (N.Y. 
2013).  In 2013, the HAIL Plan was ultimately upheld by the New York Court of 
Appeals.  See generally Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 993 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y. 
2013). 
 89. See Mann, supra note 87. 
 90. See Barron, supra note 86. 
 91. See id.  The New York Times reported this estimate from City officials on 
September 3, 2018.  Id. 
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stymied their behavior.92  According to Mitchell L. Moss, director of 
the Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New 
York University, green taxis are more likely to find passengers by 
waiting at retail hubs, transit hubs, or areas where subway lines end, 
rather “than if they cruise the streets they are authorized to cruise 
where people are not used to seeing cabs.”93  Furthermore, Moss 
notes that “[t]he benefit of Uber is it can come pick you up in highly 
dispersed locations, which the green taxi can’t really do because it’s 
got to stay near dense transit pickup locations.”94 
Because many green taxi operators also drive for Uber, the 
rideshare company contends they help green taxi drivers by 
connecting them with riders.95  More than 50,000 trips to green taxis 
are dispatched from Uber every month.96  This dispatch connection is 
particularly advantageous for riders in distant neighborhoods, since 
green taxis can be more difficult to hail from the street than from an 
app.  However, seeing an apple green-colored borough taxi pull up, 
rather than the expected personal vehicle, can be confusing to users.97  
Nevertheless, because green taxis are geographically restricted, they 
have a difficult time competing with app-based FHVs.  Green taxis 
are especially at a disadvantage compared to yellow taxis and FHVs 
at airports, where they are allowed to drop off passengers but cannot 
pick them up unless the pick-up is prearranged (sent by a dispatcher).  
Thus, because of these restrictions, the green taxi must “go to the 
airports empty if they are dispatched for a pickup or return empty if 
they take someone there.”98 
C. Rideshares Embrace, Rather than Overlook, the Outer 
Boroughs 
1. Rideshares (By the Numbers): More Popular than Taxis in Outer 
Boroughs 
There is a significant, growing demand for rideshares in the outer 
boroughs.  Rideshare services have been more popular in the outer 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  Yellow cabs, on the other hand, can wait in taxi lines, while FHVs are not 
restricted from picking up passengers at airports.  Id. 
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boroughs than yellow taxis since 2016.99  Today, half of all Uber rides 
start outside Manhattan — up from one‐fourth just two years ago — 
and this number does not include pickups at the City’s two airports in 
Queens.100 
In 2015, FiveThirtyEight conducted a study analyzing pickup data 
from nearly 19 million Uber rides in New York City from April to 
September 2014 and January to June 2015.101  It found that “Uber has 
not caused a net increase in pickups, at least not in Manhattan . . . . 
Instead, the ride-share service is replacing cabs in the center of the 
city and supplementing them in the outer boroughs.”102  The study 
concluded that in central Manhattan, where green taxis (aka borough 
taxis) are not allowed to make pick-ups, 
Uber added 3.82 million trips in April through June of 
[2015] . . . compared with the same period [in 2014] . . . . Taxis, in the 
same area, lost 3.83 million pickups.  The total number of pickups 
was virtually unchanged: 39.37 million in 2014 versus 39.36 million in 
2015.103 
In 2017, Uber, after years of being notoriously withholding about 
its data, released ridership data to the New York Times taken from 
fifty sample residential areas in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and on 
Staten Island (areas that were known to have limited access to public 
transportation).104  This data revealed that ridership in the outer 
boroughs significantly rose from the year before.  In August 2017, for 
example, Uber made a total of 167,194 weekly pickups in these areas, 
compared to the 56,721 weekly pickups it made as of August 2016.105  
 
 99. Todd W. Schneider, Analyzing 1.1 Billion NYC Taxi and Uber Trips, with a 
Vengeance (Mar. 2018), http://toddwschneider.com/posts/analyzing-1-1-billion-nyc-
taxi-and-uber-trips-with-a-vengeance/ [https://perma.cc/ZS2L-PGFY] (aggregating 
data from ride-hail apps Uber, Lyft, and Via, compared to yellow and green taxis). 
 100. Winnie Hu, Uber, Surging Outside Manhattan, Tops Taxis in New York City, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/nyregion/uber-taxis-
new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/AYY6-U3X6] [hereinafter Hu, Uber Surging]. 
 101. Reuben Fischer-Baum & Carl Bialik, Uber Is Taking Millions of Manhattan 
Rides Away from Taxis, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/uber-is-taking-millions-of-manhattan-rides-away-
from-taxis/ [https://perma.cc/6MRD-U9C8]; see also Schneider, supra note 99. 
 102. Fischer-Baum & Bialik, supra note 101. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Hu, Uber Surging, supra note 100. 
 105. Id. (“In St. Albans, [Queens,] weekly pickups rose to 6,370 from 1,870 the 
year before, . . . . In the Flatlands neighborhood in Brooklyn, which has no subway 
station, there were 13,380 weekly pickups, or nearly four times the 3,598 pickups the 
previous year.  In Starrett City, a vast housing development, weekly pickups rose to 
2,261 from 699.  Nine areas were on Staten Island, a borough where public transit is 
sparse . . . . In the New Springville area, weekly pickups soared to 1,494 from 591.”). 
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The study drew more than half of the fifty sample residential areas 
from Queens alone,106 where access to public transportation is sparse 
and commutes into Manhattan by bus or subway are long.107 
Indeed, rideshares are outperforming taxicabs in New York City.  
As of October 2017, more passengers are choosing ride-hail apps over 
yellow taxis.108  Analyzing TLC datasets of over 1.1 billion individual 
taxi trips between January 2009 and June 2015, Todd W. Schneider 
reported that “February 2017 marked the first month that ride-hailing 
services collectively made more trips than yellow and green taxis 
combined, and by December 2017, ride-hailing services made 65% 
more pickups than taxis did.”109  Schneider concluded that the ride-
hail sector “now makes more pickups per month than taxis did in any 
month since the dataset began [in] 2009.”110  In addition, according to 
City data,  yellow taxis made an average of 277,042 daily trips in July 
2017 (collecting $4 million in fares per day), as compared to 332,231 
daily trips (and $4.9 million in fares) the year before.111  Data 
indicates FHV use is increasing while taxi trips are declining, 
suggesting that FHVs have created new demand for backseat rides in 
Manhattan.112  Not only are rideshare passengers choosing FHVs 
over yellow taxis, but FHVs are also replacing other modes of transit.  
Without FHVs, approximately 49% to 61% of ride-hailing trips would 
not have been made at all, or made by walking, biking, or transit.113  
 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Eric Jaffe, Where the New York City Subway Doesn’t Go, CITYLAB 
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2015/08/where-the-new-york-
city-subway-doesnt-go/400538/ [https://perma.cc/98BJ-LHLE]. 
 108. See Hu, Uber Surging, supra note 100. 
 109. Schneider, supra note 99. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Hu, supra note 72. 
 112. See Laura Bliss, How to Fix New York City’s ‘Unsustainable’ Traffic Woes, 
CITYLAB (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/12/how-to-fix-
new-york-citys-unsustainable-traffic-woes/548798/ [https://perma.cc/86HL-UX53] 
(“Total passenger trips increased 15 percent, even as taxi trips declined, in that time 
period. That means TNCs [transportation network companies] have created new 
demand for backseat rides in Manhattan. And they increased the amount of miles 
traveled by for-hire vehicles around by a whopping 36 percent, over the same time 
period. That adds up to more than 600 million miles of motor vehicle traffic in the 
past 3 years alone — reflecting not only the staggering growth in rides, but a trend 
toward lengthier trips and more ‘deadheading,’ or cars traveling without 
passengers.”). 
 113. See REGINA R. CLEWLOW & GOURI SHANKAR MISHRA, DISRUPTIVE 
TRANSPORTATION: THE ADOPTION, UTILIZATION, AND IMPACTS OF RIDE-HAILING IN 
THE UNITED STATES 8 (2017), 
https://its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/?frame=https%3A%2F%2Fitspubs.ucdavi
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Additionally, 50% of for-hire vehicle users surveyed in the City’s 
Mobility Report said they had substituted a mass transit journey with 
a trip in a FHV.114  Importantly, FHVs have become so successful in 
part due to the decline in subway and bus service: “[T]he Mobility 
Report shows that subway ridership fell by just under one percent in 
2017, while bus ridership continued its decline from 697 million rides 
in 2010 to 638 million today.”115 Thus, because riders would otherwise 
use subways or buses, improving public transit would significantly 
help reduce congestion.116 
2. How TNCs Compare to SHLs and Taxis 
The Tri-State Transportation Campaign recently conducted a study 
using publicly-available data from the TLC.117  The data, which 
reflects pick-ups and drop-offs from July through December 2017, 
constitutes the most recently available data and includes information 
for street-hail liveries (“SHLs,” more commonly known as green taxis 
or borough taxis), yellow taxis and FHVs.118  Before mid-2017, TNCs 
were not required to report this data.119   Aggregating hundreds 
of thousands of individual pick-ups and drop-offs by FHVs, SHLs, 
and yellow taxis, the study cross-references geo-tagged taxi data with 
the Census districts to analyze the income level of the neighborhood 
where a given pick-up or drop-off occurred.120  The original purpose 
of the study was to assess the viability of a cap on FHVs in New York 
City by analyzing rider data to determine whether FHVs like Uber 
and Lyft make more pick-ups and drop-offs in congested areas of 
Manhattan than yellow or green taxis.121  While the study does 
conclude that FHVs tended to accumulate in dense, congested parts 
of Manhattan, it also reveals an interesting trend: The service patterns 
of FHVs more closely resemble those of green taxis, as opposed to 
yellow taxis, in that they serve low-income communities that are 
 
s.edu%2Findex.php%2Fresearch%2Fpublications%2Fpublication-
detail%2F%3Fpub_id%3D2752 [https://perma.cc/PKM6-CPZ7]. 
 114. HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 5. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See generally id. 
 118. Id. at 7. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (explaining that researchers “broke census tracts apart as they intersected 
taxi zones, dividing up the people in each income category based on the percentage 
overlap, and then re-aggregated these by taxi zones.  The end result is an 
approximate sixteen-category income breakdown per taxi zone.”). 
 121. Id. at 4. 
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poorly-served by yellow taxis.122  While green taxis and FHVs tend to 
serve a more widely-distributed area, yellow taxis, as a result of their 
artificial cap, tend to operate with relative frequency in higher-
income areas of New York, particularly in Manhattan below 96th 
Street.123 
The disparity in service between yellow taxis and FHVs becomes 
even more striking when the data is broken down into narrower 
income categories.124  Over 25% of yellow taxis’ pick-ups and drop-
offs come from neighborhoods with average incomes above $200,000, 
compared to 15% of the customer base for FHVs, and 10% of the 
customer base for SHLs.125  As a result of FHVs’ widespread service 
into territories occupied by green cabs, green taxi drivers are likewise 
suffering economically from Uber’s growth.126  Not only are the 
number of active green taxis on the decline,127 but green taxi drivers 
are working fewer hours than they used to,128 making fewer trips than 
they were in previous years, and are generating less daily revenue 
overall.129  For example, in May 2018, green taxis made 25,693 trips a 
day across the entire city, a 55% decrease from May 2015 (the busiest 
month on record), which accounted for 57,637 trips.130  Uber, on the 
other hand, accounted for over 84,000 trips in one month to or from a 
 
 122. Id. at 7 (“TNCs [transportation network companies] . . . draw 36% of their 
customer base from neighborhoods with an average income below $45,000.  By 
contrast, yellow cabs only draw 26% of their customer base from those same 
neighborhoods.  At the other end of the income scale, TNCs serve barely more 
passengers in neighborhoods with high average incomes: 37%.  Yellow cabs, however, 
draw over half of their customer base from those high-income neighborhoods.”). 
 123. Id. at 6. 
 124. Id. at 8. 
 125. Id. (“The inflection point where the proportion of trips switches is around 
$99,999.  Below that threshold, SHLs and TNCs derive a larger share of their 
customers from those income levels than yellow cabs.  Above $100,000, the reverse is 
true.”). 
 126. See generally supra Section I.B.2.  As previously mentioned, green taxis (also 
known as borough taxis or street-hail liveries (“SHLs”)) can pick up above East 96th 
Street, West 110th Street, and in the outer boroughs. 
 127. See Barron, supra note 86 (stating that only 3514 permits are considered 
active by the taxi commission, even though 8345 have been issued since 2013). 
 128. Id. (finding that green cab drivers’ working hours declined from 6.5 hours in 
May 2015 to 5.7 hours in May 2018). 
 129. Id.  Fewer trips and decreased hours spent working has created less revenue 
for the green taxi sector, from $862,099 a day citywide in May 2015 to $386,965 a day 
citywide in May 2018.  Id. 
 130. Id.  According to the taxi commission, a third of green cabs’ service between 
January and May 2018 stemmed from pick-ups in Brooklyn; about 31% came from 
northern Manhattan; 29.5% were in Queens; only 5.3% were in the Bronx; and only 
1/100th of 1% on Staten Island.  Id. 
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single neighborhood (East New York, Brooklyn) during Summer 
2018.131 
While FHVs also skew towards higher income levels, and SHLs 
serve a higher proportion of low-income neighborhoods than either 
FHVs or yellow cabs, the disparity between FHVs and SHLs is much 
narrower than between FHVs and yellow cabs.132  The report 
attributes the similarity in service patterns between FHVs and SHLs 
— and, therefore, the benefit to lower-income riders — to their 
licensing model.133  Unlike yellow taxis, which operate under a strict 
medallion regime that caps their numbers, FHVs and green taxis do 
not have an “over-inflated” cost of entry.134  In recent years, as 
previously mentioned, the yellow taxi economy has become depressed 
due to the influx of marketplace competition like Uber.  As this study 
reveals, subjecting rideshares to an artificial cap will impact service to 
lower-income customers — who proportionately tend to live in 
boroughs further from Manhattan,135 in communities that are made 
up predominantly of minorities136 — not to mention disabled 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 8. 
 133. Id. at 8. 
 134. Id.; see also Speta, supra note 70, at 114.  The regulation of taxi cabs as 
“common carriers” can be justified in terms of market failures: 
Average rate regulation, especially if based on distance or a combination of 
distance and time for the trip, creates another problem: not all trips of the 
same distance or time are of equal value.  This is because some trips will 
result in deadheading—an ‘empty’ return trip—and thus any trip has two 
values, the value of the trip itself and the odds that a deadhead will result.  
Given this variation, cabs, even when subject to average rate regulation, will 
compete for trips that are less likely to result in empty returns and may 
simply refuse trips that are highly likely to result in empty returns.  In 
practical terms, this means that cabs will congregate in downtown areas and 
may refuse to travel to less dense or poorer areas. It is not surprising 
therefore that one regulation that has generally accompanied taxi regulation 
is the requirement to haul all customers.  This is the duty to serve of 
common carrier regulation. 
Speta, supra note 70, at 114. 
 135. See generally HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51. 
 136. Richard A. Marcantonio et al., Confronting Inequality in Metropolitan 
Regions: Realizing the Promise of Civil Rights and Environmental Justice in 
Metropolitan Transportation Planning, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1019 (2017) 
(“Continuing disparities manifest themselves in astonishingly high income and wealth 
inequality between whites and people of color, especially African Americans and 
Latinos.”); see also id. at 1022 (“Twentieth century metropolitan growth in the 
United States resulted in regions nominally linked by transportation infrastructure 
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riders.137  The effects of this uneven access to rideshare transportation 
may be far-reaching for major urban cities like New York, given the 
link between transportation access with “employment outcomes and 
other opportunities, especially in communities of color.”138  Because 
yellow taxis “disproportionately serve higher-income communities”139 
as a result of their cap, maintaining accessible, affordable TNC and 
green taxi service in the outer boroughs is essential.  Ultimately, the 
study concluded that an artificial cap on FHVs would not accomplish 
as much decongestion as the City Council might hope.140 
Similar patterns have emerged in other large U.S. cities like San 
Francisco, Chicago, and Houston, where demand for rideshares tends 
to concentrate in downtown or central business district parts of the 
city, spreading outwardly to outlying neighborhoods and suburbs.141  
A similar phenomenon is also occurring in Los Angeles, 142 a city with 
a dense population like New York, albeit one that is massively 
interconnected by highways: Lyft drivers serve 99.8% of the 
population of L.A. County.143  While rideshare users in Los Angeles 
live disproportionately in high-income neighborhoods relative to the 
 
and shared housing and labor markets, but separated by vast differences in racial 
composition, wealth, crime, health outcomes, and access to opportunities like quality 
education and employment.  These disparities often map consistently onto patterns of 
racial segregation.”). 
 137. Molly Taft, Why Can’t Uber and Lyft Be More Wheelchair-Friendly?, 
CITYLAB (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/12/ride-
hailing-users-disabilitiies-wheelchair-access-uber/577855/ [https://perma.cc/8J65-
3HE4]. 
 138. Marcantonio, supra note 136, at 1019–20 (“Although race and class residential 
segregation diminished somewhat in the late 1980s, differential access to 
opportunities remains a significant problem today.  Transportation is both a key 
driver of these continued problems and a sector on which billions of dollars of 
federal, state, regional, and local funds are spent every year.  Although 
transportation infrastructure is but a single component of a mix of factors at play, 
there is overwhelming evidence linking transportation with employment outcomes 
and other opportunities, especially in communities of color.”). 
 139. HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 4. 
 140. See id. at 5. 
 141. See Hu, Uber Surging, supra note 100. 
 142. See Anne Elizabeth Brown, Ridehail Revolution: Ridehail Travel and Equity 
in Los Angeles (Jan. 1, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA) (on file with 
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations); see also Laura Bliss, Lyft Is Reaching 
L.A. Neighborhoods Where Taxis Wouldn’t, CITYLAB (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/06/lyft-is-reaching-la-neighborhoods-
where-taxis-wouldnt/563810/ [https://perma.cc/367Z-SPRG]; David Z. Morris, Ride-
Hailing Apps May Benefit Poor and Minority Communities the Most, Study 
Suggests, FORTUNE (June 30, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/30/uber-lyft-poor-
minority-communities/ [https://perma.cc/7JLF-X6W2]. 
 143. Brown, supra note 142, at 134. 
966 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
broader population,144 users living in low-income areas made more 
Lyft trips per person in comparison to middle- and high-income 
communities.145 
3. Transit Inequity in the Outer Boroughs 
Significant reliance and ridership from the outer boroughs are 
attributable to a variety of factors.  First, outer boroughs tend to offer 
poorer, more limited access to transportation.146  New York City has 
472 stations connecting 122 of the City’s 189 neighborhoods, but only 
75% of the population (6.3 million New Yorkers out of a population 
of over 8 million) has access to a subway within their 
neighborhood.147  Transit deserts, or areas that are further than a ten-
minute walk from the subway,148 are common in outer borough areas 
like Queens, the Bronx, and Southeast Brooklyn.149  For instance, 
while 50% of FHV users citywide indicated that ride-hail service 
replaced a transit trip, a staggering 68% of riders in Northern 
Manhattan and Northern Bronx reported using ride-hail services to 
replace transit trips.150  Additionally, in Southern Bronx, Northern 
Bronx, and Staten Island, over 68% of people said that ride-hail 
services replaced local bus trips.151 
“[B]ootstraps capitalists” have been filling the transportation voids 
in transit deserts by providing commuter vans, aka “jitney” or “dollar 
vans,”152 since the mid-80s.153  Known as the “shadow transportation 
 
 144. Id.; see also CLEWLOW & MISHRA, supra note 113, at 7 (citing Aaron Smith, 
Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (May 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-
economy/ [https://perma.cc/L8BL-3Y5R]). 
 145. Brown, supra note 142, at 134.  Ultimately, a rider’s greater use of Lyft 
depended not on income, but whether they owned a personal car.  Id. 
 146. See Jaffe, supra note 107. 
 147. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, SERVICE 
DENIED: ACCESSIBILITY AND THE NEW YORK CITY SUBWAY SYSTEM 1 (2018), 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/documents/Service_Denied_072018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE7V-
SR53] [hereinafter SERVICE DENIED]. 
 148. See Jaffe, supra note 107. 
 149. See Thomas J. Campanella, Opinion, Watering New York’s Transit Deserts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/opinion/mta-new-
york-transit-deserts.html [https://perma.cc/3RKF-U8MR]. 
 150. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW YORK CITY MOBILITY REPORT 26 (2018), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/mobility-report-2018-print.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LEA-V72X]. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal 
Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 176 (2001). The name 
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system,”154 dollar vans and other shuttles operate heavily in the areas 
identified as transit deserts, or areas that are underserved by buses 
and subways.155  Over 100,000 riders a day rely on these unofficial 
shuttles.156  Today, much of the informal culture of dollar vans is a 
vestige of its tenacious, utilitarian roots: typically, there are no 
timetables or service maps, or even official stops or stations.157  In 
fact, most riders hear about this shadow network through word of 
mouth, or by chancing upon the vans in the street.  New Yorkers 
living in outer boroughs are heavily reliant on this informal bus 
system, touted as an efficient way to supplement mass transit with 
privately-owned transit entrepreneurs158 and as providing not only an 
alternative source of transportation, but job creation. 
Many areas in the outer boroughs may also be classified as “transit 
deserts” because they do not provide access to the subways for 
disabled or elderly residents.  Over half of the neighborhoods (sixty-
two out of 122) served by subways are inaccessible under Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standards.159  Neighborhoods without 
 
“dollar vans” is a nod to the early days when a ride cost $1.00. See Annie Correal, 
Inside the Dollar Van Wars, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/nyregion/inside-the-dollar-van-wars.html 
[https://perma.cc/5NYU-36Q9]. 
 153.  The history of New York City’s dollar vans is rooted in a 1980 transit strike, 
which halted subway trains and bus transportation throughout the five boroughs.  See 
Aaron Reiss, New York’s Shadow Transit, NEW YORKER (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://projects.newyorker.com/story/nyc-dollar-vans/ [https://perma.cc/YXN3-
9D5U].  Residents in these transit deserts crowdsourced together and began using 
their own vehicles to transport people to their destinations, charging a dollar for the 
service. Id.  The strike ended eleven days later, but what started as an ad hoc 
community transportation system carried on. Id.  Even though subways and buses 
resumed, there was still “huge demand in neighborhoods that weren’t well served by 
public transit even when buses and trains were running.” See also Garnett, supra note 
152, at 203–04; Lisa Margonelli, The (Illegal) Private Bus System that Works, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/10/the-
illegal-private-bus-system-that-works/246166/ [https://perma.cc/L5VZ-SLY5]. 
 154. See Reiss, supra note 153. 
 155. See id. (noting these areas are “mostly in peripheral, low-income 
neighborhoods that contain large immigrant communities and lack robust public 
transit”). 
 156. See Correal, supra note 152. 
 157. See Reiss, supra note 153 (“Dollar-van lines, by their nature, change slightly 
from day to day owing to the needs of passengers, road maintenance, or the caprice 
of drivers . . . .”). 
 158. Margonelli, supra note 153. 
 159. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008); see 
OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 54, at 3, 24; 
see also Danielle Furfaro, Over Half of NYC Neighborhoods Leave Disabled People 
Stranded, N.Y. POST (July 17, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/07/17/over-
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ADA accessible stations are in Manhattan’s Lower East Side and 
many parts of Harlem; in Queens, Long Island City; and in Brooklyn, 
in the neighborhoods of Bushwick, Bay Ridge, Sunset Park, and most 
of Coney Island.160  Critically, of these sixty-two ADA transit deserts, 
fifty-five are located in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens.161  
Furthermore, 76% of New York City’s 472 subway stations are not 
ADA accessible, with the quarter that are accessible geographically 
clustered rather than evenly dispersed throughout neighborhoods.162  
As a result, 640,000 mobility-impaired and elderly residents live near 
subway stations that they cannot use.163  For older New Yorkers, 
parents with young children in strollers, and people who use 
wheelchairs or have a disability, subway stations lacking elevators 
limit their ability to travel.  These riders must instead devise 
alternative routes and plan out their travel to ensure they can access 
transportation.164  This may involve taking accessible buses to another 
subway that is ADA accessible but further away from their home, 
making for even longer commute times.165  However, these residents 
can alternatively call Uber or hail a taxi to take them to an accessible 
station.  Ride-share apps include an option for accessible vehicles, 
and a new rule going into effect on July 1, 2019, will require rideshare 
companies to complete 25% of their trips every year using wheelchair-
accessible vehicles.166  In fact, according to the City’s Mobility 
Report, respondents who reported having a disability were 
significantly more likely to call for a FHV several times a week than 
were those who did not indicate having a disability.167 
 
half-of-nyc-neighborhoods-leave-disabled-people-stranded/ [https://perma.cc/PSG9-
7FG4]. 
 160. See Furfaro, supra note 159. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.; see also Access2024, TRANSITCENTER (Jan. 31, 2019), 
http://transitcenter.org/2019/01/31/access2024/ [https://perma.cc/FEQ4-ZUTR]. 
 163. See SERVICE DENIED, supra note 147, at 4 (noting that ADA upgrades are not 
only an “ethical measure towards greater inclusivity or a regulatory measure towards 
legal compliance,” but essential in order to increase access to the subway system and 
“relieve overcrowding at the handful of ‘key’ stations that serve a disproportionate 
share of mobility-impaired riders”). 
 164. See id. at 2. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Riders Outside Manhattan Can Now Hail Accessible 
Taxis, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/nyregion/accessible-taxis-disabled-nyc.html 
[https://perma.cc/VD8L-S634]. 
 167. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 150, at 26. 
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Meanwhile, paratransit services — a special transportation services 
for people with disabilities — are generally not affordable.  The 
average cost of a paratransit ride in the United States is $29.30, which 
is three and a half times more expensive than the average cost of a 
regular fixed-route bus or rail trip.168  While New York City’s 
federally-mandated paratransit service, Access-A-Ride, costs only 
$2.50 per ride (the same price as a subway fare), the MTA pays a 
staggering $67.33 on average per trip.169  In New York, Washington 
D.C., Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Toronto, Uber is now 
contracting directly with the paratransit firm MV Transportation to 
provide services for disabled customers, promising a fifteen-minute 
wait time or less and fares equivalent to UberX.170  These wheelchair-
accessible vehicles are operated by MV Transportation drivers using 
the Uber app.171  While fifteen minutes is still a long wait time, it is 
more reliable than Access-a-Ride door-to-door paratransit service in 
New York City, which can be “hit or miss,” according to wheelchair 
users who cannot rely on the subway to get around because less than 
a quarter are accessible to wheelchairs.172  Even so, only 554 vehicles 
out of the nearly 118,000 active rideshare vehicles are wheelchair 
accessible, prompting accessibility advocates to sue Uber and Lyft for 
providing “substandard or nonexistent service to people in 
 
 168. Luz Lazo, Uber Flirts with Transit Agencies Across the U.S. for a Share of 
Paratransit Services, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/uber-flirts-with-transit-
agencies-across-the-us-for-a-share-of-paratransit-services/2016/03/05/5eb8b118-d751-
11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/6VFW-4BKF] (reporting that a 
fixed-route bus or rail trip costs, on average, $8.15, according to the Government 
Accountability Office). 
 169. Stephen M. Joseph & Michael Gartland, MTA Denying Access-A-Ride to 
Some Riders Claiming Disabilities, N.Y. POST (Apr. 20, 2014, 4:26 AM), 
https://nypost.com/2014/04/20/mta-denying-access-a-ride-to-some-riders-claiming-
disabilities/ [https://perma.cc/FRM3-MU44]. 
 170. Faiz Siddiqui, Wheelchair-Accessible Uber Service Comes to D.C. and Five 
Other Cities, Expanding Mobility Options for People with Disabilities, WASH. POST: 
BLOGS (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/11/20/uber-launches-
wheelchair-accessible-service-dc-five-other-cities/ [https://perma.cc/SH7P-MPM9]. 
 171. See Taft, supra note 137. 
 172. Id.  While paratransit rides in most cities need to be booked a day in advance, 
riders are often forced to wait for late or delayed vans or spend long periods of time 
on a bus following a scheduled pickup.  Id.  Wheelchair user, Valerie Piro, 
commented that in the ten years she has used a wheelchair, she “has been routinely 
stranded by no-show vans and trucked around for hours on tangled routes,” referring 
to her “extended Access-A-Ride trips from . . . Bay Ridge to Manhattan as ‘the 
Great Tour of Brooklyn.’”  Id. 
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wheelchairs.”173  Notably, wheelchair-accessible vehicles are 
exempted from the City’s new law capping FHV licenses. 
4. Deteriorating Subway System Plagues the Entire Transit 
Landscape 
Subway delays have a more significant impact on low-income New 
Yorkers, who tend to have longer commute times.174  Moreover, 
neighborhoods with lower household incomes — which tend to be in 
the outer boroughs — are more likely to have longer periods of 
unreliable service during the morning commute.175  Delays for lower-
income commuters can have significant consequences, like missed 
appointments or lost wages.176  For commuters who work fixed shifts, 
like fast food workers, the consequences are even more severe.  
Riders with the longest commutes tend to have fewer backup options 
because alternative lines are often further away, while commuters 
who work night shifts or odd hours are more likely to encounter 
commute disruptions for planned maintenance work.177 
Meanwhile, even with Governor Andrew M. Cuomo declaring the 
subway to be in a state of emergency in 2017, the subway system is 
still plagued by delays and overcrowding and is, in general, not 
operating efficiently or improving.178  According to the MTA, the 
“on-time rate for weekday trains is about 66 percent,” which is down 
from about 85% in 2012.179 
An increasingly unreliable subway system has, over the last five 
years, prompted an uptick in rideshare use throughout the City.180  
 
 173. Id.  Uber and Lyft have been sued at least ten times nationwide by 
accessibility advocates.  Id. 
 174. Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Tyler Blint-Welsh, Subway Delays Hit Low-Income 
New Yorkers the Hardest, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/nyregion/mta-subway-delays-income-
neighborhoods.html [https://perma.cc/4C3G-D9XR]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New 
York City Subways, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/nyregion/cuomo-declares-a-state-of-emergency-
for-the-subway.html [https://perma.cc/627Q-RTL6]. 
 179. Fitzsimmons & Blint-Welsh, supra note 174. 
 180. See BRUCE SCHALLER, MAKING CONGESTION PRICING WORK FOR TRAFFIC 
AND TRANSIT IN NEW YORK CITY 2–3 (2018), 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/makingpricingwork.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VM7F-V37M] (“The current trend toward more driving represents 
a reversal of 25 years of less driving and more transit ridership in the city.”). 
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Indeed, the extra fees associated with taking a yellow taxi are not as 
affordable as public transit — especially for low-income commuters 
— which makes the increased accessibility, lower costs, and stabilized 
access of rideshares, and options like UberPOOL so much more 
essential.  If a permanent cap causes service by rideshares in these 
areas to decrease, the costs associated with the ride will increase.181 
Additionally, riding the bus, especially from the outer boroughs, 
makes for a slow commute with inefficient routes, too many stops, 
and too many delays.  However, with improved service, buses have 
the potential to be “the future of New York City public transit, 
connecting emerging job hubs outside of lower-Manhattan that are ill-
served by the subway’s hub-and-spoke network.”182  New York is 
home to 5700 buses along 330 routes with 16,000 stops and serves 
over 2 million passengers a day, which accounts for more than the 
daily ridership of LIRR, MetroNorth, PATH, and New Jersey Transit 
combined.183  And yet, as the Office of the New York City 
Comptroller Scott M. Stringer notes, the bus system receives 
insufficient attention compared to subways, commuter rail, and 
bridges, and is “too often neglected” to be performing optimally.184  
In fact, bus ridership is on the decline.  Since 2011, ridership is down 
by 16% in Manhattan, and 4% in Brooklyn.185  Declining ridership is 
no surprise when the average New York City bus spends half of its 
time moving, and the other half in traffic.186  Demographically, 75% 
of bus commuters are people of color, and 55% are foreign born 
(which is “significantly higher than subway commuters and New 
Yorkers more generally”).187  Regarding income level, the average 
 
 181. See generally id. 
 182. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 54, 
at 1. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 5 (noting the bus system lost 100 million passenger rides in the last 8 
years).  In 2017, taxis and rideshare drivers transported three-quarters as many 
people as local buses in New York City in 2017 (543 million taxi/for-hire passengers 
compared with 712 million local bus passengers).  See SCHALLER, supra note 180, at 
4. 
 186. See id. (“21 percent is spent at red lights and 22 percent at bus stops.”).  
Average bus speeds vary dramatically among the boroughs: the slowest average 
speeds are in Manhattan (5.5 mph), Brooklyn (6.3 mph), and the Bronx (6.5 mph), 
compared to local routes in Queens (8.1 mph) and Staten Island (11.4 mph).  Id. 
 187. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 54, at 
9–10 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (ACS): 2011-
2015 ACS 5-YEAR ESTIMATES (2016), https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/technical-documentation/table-and-geography-changes/2015/5-year.html 
[https://perma.cc/588Y-CGR2]). 
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personal income of bus commuters is $28,455, compared to $40,000 
for subways commuters.188  Therefore, low-income and minority 
residents are hurt the most by the lack of effective bus service and 
likewise may be most inclined to turn to services like UberPOOL. 
5. Yellow Taxis Do Not Reliably Service the Outer Boroughs 
Yellow taxi cabs have traditionally underserved or unlawfully 
denied rides to people and communities of color.189  Research and 
anecdotal evidence supports the notion that discrimination and 
implicit racial biases affect the treatment of people of color in public 
accommodations in general, including taxis.190  For example, 
“shopping while black” was coined to describe the racial profiling 
experiences African American shoppers experience while in stores 
when a clerk follows them around to ensure they are not 
shoplifting,191 and African Americans traditionally have a more 
difficult time hailing taxi cabs.192  As for the home-sharing economy, 
a Harvard Business School study revealed that Airbnb users with 
African American sounding names were 16% less likely to be 
accepted as guests.193  Anecdotally, the hashtag #AirbnbWhileBlack 
 
 188. Id.  New Yorkers’ bus commuters have an average personal income of 
$38,840, based on data from the United States Census Bureau. Id. 
 189. See Brown, supra note 142, at 135 (“[T]axi drivers’ discrimination against 
black riders is as present today as it was in audit studies conducted three decades 
ago . . . . Taxis failed to pick up black riders for more than one-quarter of their trip 
hails (26.3%), compared to about one-fifth of trips hailed by Asian and Hispanic rider 
(19.9%) and one-seventh (14.4%) of trips hailed by white riders.  By contrast, ridehail 
services nearly eliminated the differences across rider characteristics.  On taxis, black 
riders waited 52 percent longer (between about 6 and 15 minutes) than white riders; 
by comparison, black riders waited between 11 seconds and 1 minute 43 seconds 
longer for ridehail services than white riders.”) (citing STANLEY RIDLEY ET AL., TAXI 
SERVICE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: IS IT INFLUENCED BY PATRONS’ RACE AND 
DESTINATION? (1989)). 
 190. See Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1290 (2017). 
 191. See Dan Harris & Gitika Ahuja, Race for a Cab: When Hailing a Ride Isn’t 
So Black and White, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/race-
cab-hailing-ride-black-white/story?id=7223511 [https://perma.cc/T9FW-NPE2]. 
 192. See CORNELL BELCHER & DEE BROWN, HAILING WHILE BLACK: 
NAVIGATING THE DISCRIMINATORY LANDSCAPE OF TRANSPORTATION 3 (2015), 
http://www.brilliant-corners.com/post/hailing-while-black [https://perma.cc/EC2B-
DTHV] (surveying the discriminatory transportation landscape in Chicago in an 
Uber-sponsored study); see also Harris & Ahuja, supra note 191; see Leong & 
Belzer, supra note 190, at 1290. 
 193. See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment, 2 AM. ECON. J. 9, 1 (2017).  While the app-based, 
algorithmic nature of rideshare platforms should theoretically rectify the historical 
problem of discrimination in the transportation industry, a study conducted by 
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is used by minority and black Airbnb users to highlight the 
discrimination.194  Overall, discrimination by taxi drivers has posed a 
very real, unfair, and unlawful problem for minorities based on the 
color of their skin or destination.195 
Faced with the accessibility issues of public transit, the prospect of 
a private car or less-expensive carpool option at the tap of an app has 
incentivized riders across all income groups to use the service.  Thus, 
seemingly overnight, rideshares have assimilated into the lives of city-
dwellers.  The growing popularity and proliferation of rideshares is 
evidence they fill a gap in New York City’s public transit system,196 
particularly for lower-income communities, communities of color, and 
for neighborhoods in the outer boroughs of New York, providing 
these communities with access to reliable transportation.197 
 
researchers from Stanford, MIT, and the University of Washington found 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender by individual rideshare drivers.  See 
Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network 
Companies (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w22776, 2016); see 
Taylor Kubota, Researchers from Stanford, MIT and the University of Washington 
Find Ride-Share Drivers Discriminate Based on Race and Gender, STAN. NEWS (Oct. 
31, 2016), https://news.stanford.edu/2016/10/31/researchers-stanford-mit-university-
washington-find-ride-share-drivers-discriminate-based-race-gender/ 
[https://perma.cc/99FB-SSTK].  While it is illegal for taxi drivers to deny a 
streethailer, it is well-known that taxi drivers do discriminate, exercising “subjective” 
discretion over who they stop for.  See, e.g., Anne E. Brown, L.A.’s Taxi Industry 
Discriminates Against Black Riders. If We Don’t Force Them to Change, They 
Won’t, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2018, 4:10 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/livable-city/la-oe-brown-racism-taxi-uber-lyft-
201812-story.html [https://perma.cc/9UM6-2KW5]; Neuman, supra note 45.  
Rideshare drivers on the other hand connect with passengers using an app’s objective 
algorithm.  Conducting tests in Seattle and Boston, using African American and 
white university students to study the behavior of UberX and Lyft drivers, the 
Stanford, MIT, and the University of Washington researchers collected data on 
nearly 1500 rides on controlled routes.  See Ge et al., supra.  While the wait time 
discrepancy for passengers with African American-sounding names was minimal (a 
30% longer wait tended to be a ninety-second difference and could be based on a 
variety of factors), the cancellation rate for African American sounding names was 
more than twice as frequent compared to white sounding names.  Id. at 9, 12.  
Moreover, because rideshare platforms operate using a rating system, “the likelihood 
that the ratings will reflect the conscious or unconscious bias of the provider entering 
the rating” is increased.  See Leong & Belzer, supra note 190, at 1293.  But see text 
accompanying supra note 189. 
 194. See Maggie Penman et al., #AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes 
The Sharing Economy, NPR (Apr. 26, 2016, 12:10 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-how-hidden-bias-
shapes-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/65W7-G3WW]. 
 195. See generally Leong & Belzer, supra note 190. 
 196. See SCHALLER, supra note 180, at 4. 
 197. See Carl Bialik et al., Uber Is Serving New York’s Outer Boroughs More 
Than Taxis Are, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 10, 2015, 2:06 PM), 
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D. The Transportation Landscape in Light of Rideshares 
Research supports the City’s assertion that the increased number 
of vehicles, which is linked to the rideshare economy’s recent growth, 
has lowered traffic speeds, especially in denser areas of Manhattan 
below 60th street.198  Traffic speeds have declined consistently since 
2012, from 9.1 miles per hour in 2010 to 7.2 miles per hour in 2016199 
— a 23% reduction in rate.200  Further, the average wait time for 
drivers, in between trips, is now eleven minutes, while the number of 
unoccupied taxi or FHV vehicles has increased by 81% in 
Manhattan’s central business district since 2013.201  According to one 
transportation analytics firm, lost hours spent in traffic and the excess 
fuel costs as a result of longer times spent on the road cost the New 
York City economy $17 billion in 2016.202  However, the disparate 
impact that such a cap on FHVs will have on outer borough 
communities should dissuade the TLC from permanently 
implementing one moving forward. 
1. Problems Arising as a Result of a Permanent Cap 
Access to rideshares in the boroughs will become even more 
restricted if the supply of FHVs remains permanently capped.  
Drivers will opt instead to drive around areas they expect to have 
higher demand — such as Midtown, Manhattan.  As transportation 
expert Bruce Schaller notes: 
[v]ehicle caps have been used for taxicabs for decades in major cities 
across the country.  They have been applied to overall fleet size, 
however.  Rather than reducing traffic in the most congested part of 
 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/uber-is-serving-new-yorks-outer-boroughs-more-
than-taxis-are/ [https://perma.cc/GXT8-3V7Q]. 
 198. See generally HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51. 
 199. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 150, at 13, 18; see also Vincent 
Barone, Congestion Pricing, Not a Cap on Uber, Will Fix NYC Traffic Woes, 
AMNEWYORK (June 25, 2018, 8:06 PM), https://www.amny.com/transit/congestion-
pricing-nyc-1.19429971 [https://perma.cc/U6QD-RTE7] (“[T]ravel speeds in 
Manhattan below 60th Street slowed to 7.2 mph last year, a drop from 9.1 mph in 
2010.”); Laura Bliss, supra note 112 (noting that the average traffic speed in central 
Manhattan during business hours dropped to about six miles per hour in 2017). 
 200. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 5. 
 201. See BRUCE SCHALLER, EMPTY SEATS, FULL STREETS: FIXING MANHATTAN’S 
TRAFFIC PROBLEM 1 (2018), 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/emptyseats.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3A9-
XM6D]. 
 202. See Bliss, supra note 112. 
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town, the result has been that cab drivers tend to concentrate in 
congested downtown areas where trip demand is most intense.203 
Thus, as a result of a cap, customers in the outer boroughs 
searching for a rideshare vehicle will likely suffer from even longer 
wait times and inflated prices. 
In addition, there tends to be high turnover amongst Uber drivers.  
For example, the thirty-day user retention for the Uber driver app 
dropped to around 47% between January and May of 2017 based on 
an analysis of app downloads and usage.204  If potential new drivers 
are unable to obtain a vehicle, either because leasing an already 
licensed FHV is too expensive or because they are unable to now 
license their personal vehicle as an FHV as a result of the 
moratorium, then the number of available rideshare drivers will fall 
over time, further impacting supply.  Similarly, not all rideshare 
drivers work full-time.  A big draw of the gig economy for workers is 
that they can drive for Uber or Lyft as a part-time independent 
contractor for a source of alternative income. 
2. In Light of Enduring Transit Inequality, Rideshares Provide 
Meaningful Service 
Ridesharing’s popularity and growth in New York City and other 
urban centers over the last decade is evidence not simply of society’s 
enthusiasm for a tech-dominated world, but also of a very real need 
for reliable transportation.205  Lawmakers should recognize and 
 
 203. BRUCE SCHALLER, THE NEW AUTOMOBILITY: LYFT, UBER AND THE FUTURE 
OF AMERICAN CITIES 30 (2018), 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/automobility.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZMA-NG2S]. 
 204. See Natasha Lomas, Uber Has Seen a Sharp Drop in New Driver Retention 
this Year: Apptopia, TECHCRUNCH (June 23, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/23/uber-has-seen-a-sharp-drop-in-new-driver-
retention-this-year-apptopia/ [https://perma.cc/4RSJ-TT22].  In June 2017, Uber 
made driver retention a focus with its “180 Days of Change” pledge to make 
improvements for its 750,000 drivers in the United States (and 2 million drivers 
globally).  See Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber Has More Work to Do Winning over 
Drivers, CNN: BUSINESS (Dec. 18, 2017, 11:54 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/uber-drivers-180-days-of-
change/index.html [https://perma.cc/6PT3-5PFH] (“Among the new features 
introduced since June are a 24/7 hotline for drivers, payment for the time drivers 
spend waiting for fares, and changes to the app to make it easier for customers to 
tip.”). 
 205. See Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 
43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 35 (2016) (“There are three interconnected forces that 
gave rise to the sharing economy: modern trust, technology, and economic 
pressure.”). 
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capitalize that rideshares are filling an essential “transit gap” — a not-
so-new phenomenon where people without cars, dependent on transit 
to get to work and live productively in their urban society, have to 
turn to alternative options like rideshares for transportation.206  
Transportation is inextricably linked to one’s quality of life, impacting 
“health, education, employment, economic development, access to 
municipal services, residential mobility, and environmental 
quality.”207  Private cars remain the dominant mode of transportation 
in America and, in New York City, transit inequity is being further 
exacerbated by gentrification and continued residential 
segregation.208  Although equal access to mass transportation was at 
the forefront of the civil rights movement, from Rosa Parks refusing 
to give up her bus seat to a white passenger in 1955 (leading to the 
Montgomery Bus Boycotts), to the Freedom Riders of 1961, and even 
 
 206. See Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the 
United States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1191 (2003) (“Lack of car ownership and 
inadequate public transit service in many central cities and metropolitan regions with 
a high proportion of ‘captive’ transit dependents exacerbate social, economic, and 
racial isolation, especially for low-income people of color—residents who already 
have limited transportation options.”). 
 207. Id. at 1184; see Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1038 (“[I]n most regions, 
local urban transit services (mostly bus, but sometimes light rail) typically provide the 
workhorse connectivity required to meet daily travel needs for those without 
automobiles.”); Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1035–36 (“Because individuals 
generally must travel to reach their desired destinations, mobility and access are a 
precondition for participating in critical, life-enhancing activities such as 
employment, education, health care, and social contact.”). 
 208. See Bullard, supra note 206, at 1184 (calling this phenomenon potentially “a 
new urban crisis and a new form of ‘residential apartheid’”); see also Sean B. 
Seymore, Set the Captives Free!: Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and the Laws 
and Policies Which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 57, 65–66 
(2005).  Seymore states that: 
“White flight” and the racial polarization of metropolitan areas lie at the 
heart of modern transit inequity.  Both of these phenomena have been 
fueled by the construction of the interstate highway system. Transportation 
and urban development plans destroyed black communities, split them in 
half, or physically separated black residents from transportation, jobs, and 
white persons. These policies and practices laid the foundation for low-
income minority enclaves, which were usually concentrated in central cities 
or unstable older communities. As jobs, wealth, and political power moved 
to the suburbs, transportation planning was directed toward highway 
development rather than transit access. 
Id. 
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harkening back to 1896 with Plessy v. Ferguson,209 transit inequity 
continues to endure today.210 
Based on the evidence that ridesharing is working as an alternative 
to public transit, particularly when comparison to the traditional 
business of capped taxis, regulators need to take seriously the promise 
of this new economy and regulate it by different rules and regulations 
— otherwise these transit disparities will continue to endure. 
II. SEEKING JUSTICE AND TRANSIT EQUALITY 
If the City’s temporary blanket cap on rideshare vehicles is to 
become permanent, it would leave residents worse off, hindering 
residents’ much-needed access to transportation in transit deserts, and 
disproportionately affect low-income communities, communities of 
color, and ADA passengers.  Section II.A. examines whether transit 
equity advocates or residents could seek relief through the courts 
under civil rights laws, as a result of the disparate impact that would 
be created by a permanent cap on the number of rideshare vehicles in 
the five boroughs.211  If New York City’s actions violate any of these 
statutes, then what obligation or responsibility does the City have to 
provide an alternative scheme (if any)?  Section II.B. addresses the 
framework for evaluating the legality of a permanent cap, should the 
TLC attempt to implement one. 
A. Constitutionality 
Section II.A. examines the constitutionality of Int. No. 144-B, and 
possible arguments transit advocates could raise in support of the 
argument that the new law is unlawfully discriminatory because it 
decreases access to meaningful transportation options in outer 
 
 209. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 210. See David B. Oppenheimer, Color-Blindness, Racism-Blindness, and Racism-
Awareness: Revisiting Judge Henderson’s Proposition 209 Decision, 13 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 229, 251 (2011) (“[S]ubsidized public transportation is 
disproportionately provided to white neighborhoods, even though the need is greater 
in minority neighborhoods, where fewer people can afford to own cars.”). 
 211. See Seymore, supra note 208, at 74 (“Even though Congress and the President 
seek to bring transportation equity to the urban core, ‘the executive orders, laws, and 
regulations are only as good as their enforcement.’  Residents in low-income 
communities must constantly fight for their rights in spite of clear-cut mandates.  The 
continued disparate treatment has caused the transportation equity and 
environmental justice movement to seek relief through the courts.”) (citing Robert 
D. Bullard, The Anatomy of Transportation Racism, in HIGHWAY ROBBERY: 
TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 15, 25 (Robert D. Bullard et 
al. eds., 2004)). 
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boroughs and transit deserts.  And, if advocates cannot raise any 
effectively, why it is therefore troubling for a city to regulate 
something that private citizens cannot challenge in court. 
1. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that broadly 
prohibits discriminatory policies and practices, stating, “[n]o person in 
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”212  Under Title VI, “program 
or activity” refers to all operations that receive federal financial 
assistance by: 
a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or The entity of 
such State or local government that distributes such assistance and 
each such department or agency (and each other State or local 
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case 
of assistance to a State or local government.213 
Referred to as the “sleeping giant” of civil rights law, Title VI was 
passed to ensure taxpayer dollars are not “spent in any fashion which 
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial 
discrimination.”214  It also provides that recipients of federal funds 
cannot “utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, 
color, or national origin,” in addition to prohibiting intentional 
 
 212. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). 
 213. Title VI § 2000d–4a(1).  As a result of the 1988 amendments to the Act, 
“program or activity” is defined broadly to include “all of the operations” of state or 
local governments “any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.”  Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–4a.  Federal regulations make 
clear that “[f]ederal financial assistance” includes grants, loans of funds, donations or 
grants of federal property, and the detail of federal personnel.  See 28 C.F.R. § 
42.102(c) (2013). 
 214. See Jerett Yan, Rousing the Sleeping Giant: Administrative Enforcement of 
Title VI and New Routes to Equity in Transit Planning, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1131, 
1134–35 (2013); see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROTECTING AGAINST RACE, 
COLOR, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION BY RECIPIENTS OF FEDERAL FUNDS 
2 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/4yr_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FEF-
SUXD] (quoting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, Thomas 
E. Perez). 
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discrimination.215  While Title VI has been successfully used to fight 
racial disparities in transportation-related claims,216 “typical transit 
agency equity policy consists of little more than the box-checking 
exercise required by federal ‘Title VI’ regulation, which is designed to 
limit further harm to people of color — not to advance equity.”217 
It is questionable as to whether Title VI could be used by transit 
advocates and rideshare users to challenge the City’s cap on 
rideshares.  Title VI plainly pertains to activities and services 
receiving federal funding, and Uber, Lyft, and the like are privately 
owned corporations that do not receive direct federal funding.218  
Traditionally, in the context of transportation equity in New York 
City, Title VI claims have been raised against public authorities like 
the MTA, a commuter rail service (which receives federal funds to 
maintain the City’s bus and subway systems); the New York City 
Transportation Authority (“NYCTA”), a public bus and rail service; 
the Metro-North Commuter Railroad (“Metro-North”), a commuter 
rail service to the northern suburb; and the Long Island Railroad 
(“LIRR”), a commuter rail service to Long Island.219  The TLC itself 
 
 215. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2013); see also 
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering that Has No Name: Title VI and the Meaning of 
Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2014). 
 216. See, e.g., Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 
F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2001); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 
905 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated by N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 
71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 217. ZAK ACCUARDI, TRANSITCENTER, INCLUSIVE TRANSIT: ADVANCING EQUITY 
THROUGH IMPROVED ACCESS & OPPORTUNITY 6 (2018), http://transitcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Inclusive-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LWN-UHJ2].  “The 
industry-standard ‘Title VI’ analysis, a federal Civil Rights law compliance 
requirement, does not require a rigorous standard for evaluating whether planned 
projects, service cuts, or fare changes are likely to create disparate impacts on 
communities of color.”  Id. at 32. 
 218. In some cities, rideshare companies may receive a subsidy by the local 
government to provide more affordable rides.  Wyatt Cmar, How Cities Are 
Integrating Rideshare and Public Transportation, GOV’T TECH. (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/How-Cities-are-Integrating-Rideshare-and-
Public-Transportation.html [https://perma.cc/YX79-599A].  As of yet, providing 
subsidies to rideshare users has not occurred in New York City, though the use of 
commuter benefits, or paying with pre-tax dollars, has for UberPOOL rides.  Id.  But 
see Sarah Buhr, It’s Not Your Imagination, You Are Waiting Longer for an 
UberPOOL Using Your Commuter Card, TECHCRUNCH (June 28, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/28/its-not-your-imagination-you-are-waiting-longer-
for-an-uberpool-using-your-commuter-card/ [https://perma.cc/Q3EF-2E7W]. 
 219. See David A. King, Why Public Transit Is Not Living Up to Its Social 
Contract, CITYLAB (June 26, 2014), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2014/06/why-public-transit-is-not-living-up-to-
its-social-contract/373368/ [https://perma.cc/24U8-F9WW]. 
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receives federal funding as a licensing and regulatory agency for 
rideshares, but its funding is provided by City tax-levy funds.220  
Nevertheless, insofar that Title VI does provide an enforcement 
mechanism by which aggrieved transit advocates or residents could 
sue for discrimination, it is an important framework by which to 
understand these discrimination claims resulting from the actions and 
regulations by a city agency.  Where Section 601 of Title VI bars 
recipients of federal funds from “subjecting beneficiaries to racial 
discrimination,” Section 602 directs “federal agencies to promulgate 
regulations which ‘effectuate the provisions of 601.’”221 
For example, in Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles 
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, minority bus riders 
originally sued the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority under Title VI for funding and expanding rail services used 
primarily by white, suburban commuters, while at the same time 
reducing funding for buses that were largely ridden by minorities.222  
The district court held that the MTA violated Title VI’s disparate 
impact regulations, and the plaintiffs and MTA negotiated a consent 
decree that increased funding and services for the bus system.223  The 
consent decree entailed the transportation authority ultimately 
agreeing to make service improvements in the bus fleet to alleviate 
overcrowding, but fourteen months after the decree, the bus riders 
sued for enforcement, alleging the transportation authority failed to 
meet its obligations.  While the minority bus riders’ grassroots 
advocacy was ultimately effective through litigation, this suit seeking 
enforcement of the consent decree proves how difficult it is to obtain 
compliance.224  Conversely, in New York Urban League, Inc. v. New 
York, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the 
State was preliminarily enjoined from implementing a proposed fare 
increase on subways and buses, in violation of Title VI.225  Plaintiffs, 
originally suing for an injunction, claimed that NYCTA riders of the 
subway and bus system, a majority of whom are members of 
protected minority groups, pay a higher share of the cost of operating 
 
 220. See COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE FINANCE DIVISION 
ON THE FISCAL 2019 PRELIMINARY BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2018 PRELIMINARY 
MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION 2 
(2018), https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2018/03/FY19-
Taxi-and-Limousine-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PFS-CMUH]. 
 221. Title VI §§ 601–02. 
 222. 263 F.3d 104, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 223. Id. at 1047. 
 224. See Yan, supra note 214, at 1143. 
 225. 71 F.3d 1031, 1040 (2d Cir. 1995) 
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these systems than commuter line passengers, who are predominantly 
white, pay to support the commuter rail system.226  Consequently, 
they claim that this is forbidden by U.S. Department of 
Transportation (“U.S. DOT”) regulations promulgated under Title 
VI.227  The Second Circuit found that the District Court did not assert 
a sufficient enough basis for disparate impact.228  Furthermore, even 
if for argument’s sake plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of 
disparate impact, the court found that the defendants showed a 
substantial legitimate justification for the challenged conduct.229  That 
being said, minority communities have at times been successful in 
challenging regulations and transportation schemes under Title VI.  
While technical functions of Title VI may bar transit advocates from 
suing the City based on their regulations capping Uber, it is 
nevertheless important to analyze the City’s new law under this lens. 
Finally, private vehicles and independent contractor drivers for 
FHVs function in the public sphere.  Anyone is a potential customer 
who may call for a ride, so long as they have smartphone access.230  
Further, FHVs are changing the transportation landscape.231  From 
serving more passengers than taxis to capturing riders that would 
otherwise be using public transit, rideshares have tapped into a 
market of customers who are replacing public transit methods with 
rideshares.232  In addition, Uber and Lyft have begun accepting 
responsibility for this evolution by investing in plans to support 
sustainable mobility and transit innovation, such as by sharing trip 
data with cities and helping to come up with more effective street 
designs that will positively impact traffic patterns.233  Moreover, with 
Uber’s expansion into even more inherently communal or shared 
services like bikes and scooters234 — and one day, autonomous 
 
 226. Id. at 1033. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1038. 
 229. Id. at 1038–39. 
 230. See supra Section I.B.1. 
 231. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 232. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 233. Patrick Sisson, Uber Makes $10M Bet on Bikes and Transit, CURBED (Sept. 
26, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.curbed.com/2018/9/26/17903112/uber-dara-
khosrowshahi-electric-bikes-transit [https://perma.cc/4MPW-7NKM].  Uber 
announced it will share “more segmented, street-level speed data, and help develop 
best practices for street design, part of a collaboration between Ford, Uber, and Lyft 
to offer actionable information to help local governments better manage curb space.”  
Id. 
 234. Id. (“Uber will spend $10 million over three years as part of a Fund for 
Sustainable Mobility to support campaigns for safety and improved transit.  This will 
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vehicles — its push into the public transportation realm (call it a 
quasi-public realm) is even more apparent.  Uber’s new CEO, Dara 
Khosrowshahi, even announced he wants Uber to become the 
“Amazon of transportation.”235  In Mr. Khosrowshahi’s utopia, Uber 
would “offer third party transportation services” to allow “any 
transportation, totally frictionless, real time.”236  Transportation 
would be optimized linearly so the rider or commuter could choose 
between alternatives (from bikes to Uber to public transit).237 
Arguably, if Uber were to assimilate linearly alongside public 
transit like buses and subways, an exception may need to be made 
qualifying rideshares of this type to be classified as “public 
transportation.”238   Should Uber, as a private company, down the 
line become “public transportation,” decisions as to whether or not 
Title VI applies should probably not be determined by whether it 
receives federal funding.  The federal funding limitation for Title VI 
applicability would be difficult to justify in this hypothetical scenario, 
as such linear accessibility between Ubers and public transit would 
necessitate Uber working closely alongside the City government.  
Even if Uber does not receive federal funding to the extent that the 
MTA does, Uber would be acting as a system of public 
transportation.  This behavior by a public company may therefore 
warrant and trigger the type of protections for racial minorities Title 
 
include a $1 million investment to push for the passage of congestion pricing in New 
York City as well as funding for the non-profit PeopleForBikes.”); see also Andrew 
J. Hawkins, Coming Soon to the Uber App: Bikes, Rental Cars, and Public 
Transportation, VERGE (Apr. 11, 2018, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/11/17220408/uber-jump-getaround-masabi-cities-
data [https://perma.cc/LE6R-HTJC].  Residents of Washington, D.C. are now able to 
reserve and pay for Jump bikes using Uber’s app, following Uber’s acquisition of the 
electric, dockless bike-sharing company.  And in San Francisco, Uber launched a new 
car-sharing program called “Uber Rent,” allowing users to rent cars on Uber’s app 
through a partnership with Getaround.  This opportunity has since been expanded to 
Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Diego.  Prior to this new product, Uber’s 
partnership with Getaround allowed people who wanted to drive for Uber, but who 
did not own their own vehicle, to rent cars via the Uber app.  Id. 
 235. Recode, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi Says He Wants to Be the “Amazon 
of Transportation”, YOUTUBE (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Yo32U4mtE0 [https://perma.cc/TB6X-MM2B]. 
 236. Recode, Full Video and Transcript: Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi at Code 
2018, RECODE (June 4, 2018, 1:27 PM), 
https://www.recode.net/2018/5/31/17397186/full-transcript-uber-dara-khosrowshahi-
code-2018 [https://perma.cc/VL52-TUBP]. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Currently, the market of Ubers versus subways is like choosing between 
apples and oranges; Uber’s dream to become the “Amazon of transportation” would 
create the effect of choosing between apples and apples. 
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VI was meant to protect.  Under this lens, a blanket cap on rideshares 
coupled with the existing phenomenon of transit deserts would 
further highlight the disparate impact in the outer boroughs and for 
communities of color. 
If plaintiffs could raise claims under Title VI in fighting the TLC 
and City’s regulation of rideshare companies, the bar to proving such 
a violation is nonetheless very high and very difficult to prove in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s key 2001 decision in Alexander v. 
Sandoval — a transportation case itself.239  In Sandoval, the Supreme 
Court held that no private right of action existed to enforce Title VI’s 
disparate impact regulations and that challengers of an allegedly 
discriminatory policy must prove the policy intended to cause 
discrimination, not that it merely had a discriminatory impact.240  
Thus, Sandoval’s elimination of private actors’ utilization of the 
courts to implement Title VI severely weakened Title VI’s potential 
bite against state defendants and federal funding recipients like the 
TLC.  There is little basis that the City’s regulatory scheme regarding 
a cap on the number of rideshares, most of all in a progressive city 
like New York City, would be implemented with the intent to cause 
discrimination. 
2. EJ Executive Order and Administrative Enforcement 
Sandoval’s weakening of judicial enforcement of Title VI’s 
regulations (by eliminating a private right of action) does, however, 
leave open the possibility of seeking administrative enforcement of 
Title VI.241  Individuals may no longer have a right of action to 
enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations in federal courts, but 
Title VI regulations are nevertheless still valid.  As asserted by the 
Civil Rights Division’s 2001 memo following Sandoval for “Heads of 
Departments and Agencies, General Counsels and Civil Rights 
Directors,” funding agencies retained their authority and 
responsibility to enforce Title VI regulations.  Thus, a funding 
agency’s Title VI disparate impact regulation continues to be a vital 
 
 239. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (arising out of Alabama plaintiffs’ efforts to provide 
access to driver’s licenses for individuals that were not English-proficient). 
 240. Id.  Holding that the implied private right of action does not exist, the 
Supreme Court found that § 601 of Title VI allowed a plaintiff only to sue an agency 
or program for intentional discrimination.  Id. at 293. 
 241. C.R. DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 5 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/923556/download 
[https://perma.cc/FKS4-RLQ8]. 
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administrative enforcement mechanism.242  In particular, the EJ 
Executive Order issued by President Bill Clinton in 1994 requires 
federal agencies and entities receiving federal funds to implement 
Title VI by incorporating environmental justice concerns concerning 
planning and regulations.  The Order states that federally funded 
entities must “identify[] and address[], as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of [their] programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations . . . .”243  Furthermore, it 
“prohibits the exclusion of persons (or populations) from 
participating in, reaping the benefits of, or being discriminated against 
under such programs, policies, and activities, because of their race, 
color, or national origin.”244  By protecting “populations” rather than 
just “communities,” the EJ Executive Order thus “extends its 
protections to ‘low-income populations’ not otherwise protected 
under federal civil rights law.”245 
The test used by courts to determine whether a recipient’s policy or 
practice violates Title VI’s disparate impact regulations is aligned 
with that used in the pre-Sandoval case, New York Urban League, 
Inc.246  In New York Urban League, Inc., the court assessed (1) 
whether the adverse effect of the practice or policy disproportionately 
affect members of a group identified by race, color, or national origin 
(also referred to as a prima facie inquiry); (2) if so, whether the 
recipient can demonstrate the existence of a substantial legitimate 
justification for the policy or practice; and (3) whether there is an 
alternative that would achieve the same legitimate objective but with 
less of a discriminatory effect.247 
Lastly, the U.S. DOT is “one of the federal agencies charged with 
oversight authority,” and thus, the U.S. DOT’s regulations include 
affirmative obligations such as “to remove or overcome the effects of 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
 244. See Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1047. 
 245. Id. (noting the significance of “population” for transportation-related issues, 
as “population” denotes not only residents of a specific geography, but also similarly 
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particular portion of the transportation network, such as buses, and who are ‘similarly 
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compared to under Title VI, in which low-income populations would not be classified 
as protected.). 
 246. 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 247. Id.; see also N.Y.C. Env’t Justice All. v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 68–72 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
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discrimination . . . ’ [e]ven in the absence of prior discriminatory 
practice . . . .’ to ensure no future discrimination occurs.”248  However, 
although the U.S. DOT and Federal Transit Authority (which funds 
state and local transportation agencies) govern public transit like the 
MTA in New York City, they do not have regulatory or licensing 
authority over rideshare vehicles (which fall under the authority of 
the TLC).  Depending on how the U.S. DOT involves itself in 
regulating and overseeing rideshares in the future, aggrieved plaintiffs 
may have more access to make discrimination claims under the EJ 
Executive Order and Title VI. 
3. Equal Protection Claims 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from denying any person equal protection of the 
laws.249  Rideshare users from the outer boroughs who are negatively 
impacted by a cap, and other transit equity advocates, could 
contemplate raising Equal Protection claims under the theory that a 
cap on rideshares violates their right to intrastate travel.250  However, 
while the Second Circuit recognizes a constitutional right to intrastate 
travel, or the right to free movement,251 when a statute or regulation 
merely has “an effect on travel” that right does not appear to “raise 
an issue of constitutional dimension.”252  Although universal access to 
transportation is inspirational as a policy matter, it is not a 
constitutionally granted right.253  Certainly, a permanent cap on the 
number of rideshare vehicles will have an effect on lower-income, 
outer-borough residents, but because it does not rise to any 
 
 248. See Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1042. 
 249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires the government to treat all similarly situated individuals alike.  
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 250. Nassau & Suffolk Cty. Taxi Owners Ass’n v. New York, 336 F. Supp. 3d 50, 76 
(2018) (citing Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) 
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their membership in a vulnerable class . . . .”)). 
 251. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2003); King v. New 
Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
863 (1971); see Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
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 252. Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 755 F.2d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 253. The Supreme Court does recognize the right to travel as a fundamental right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See generally Sáenz v. 
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). However, that right is not unlimited, extending so far as to 
grant universal access to transportation.  
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constitutionally relevant level, an Equal Protection argument is 
unlikely to be accessible for potential plaintiffs. 
Nevertheless, another aspect under Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that potential claimants could raise is a 
“class of one” argument, wherein the plaintiff alleges an equal 
protection violation without alleging discrimination based on 
membership in a particular, protected class, the “the equal protection 
guarantee also extends to individuals who allege no specific class 
membership but are nonetheless subjected to invidious discrimination 
at the hands of government officials.”254  A class of one plaintiff 
“must plausibly allege that he or she has been intentionally treated 
differently from others similarly situated and no rational basis exists 
for that different treatment.”255  In this case, “similarity” would mean 
arguing that: 
(i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff 
to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify 
the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government 
policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in 
treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendants 
acted on the basis of a mistake.256 
Courts require the plaintiff to show she and her comparators are 
“prima facie identical” to those who are allegedly receiving 
“irrationally different” treatment,257 to prove “an inference that the 
difference in treatment ‘lack[s] any reasonable nexus with a legitimate 
governmental policy.’”258 
Positioning themselves as residents of outer boroughs compared to 
residents who live either closer to transportation, or within the areas 
of Manhattan that are well-known to be serviced by taxis, challengers 
may be able to raise a “class of one” argument because they could 
argue that rideshares mitigated the lack of yellow taxis in areas like 
the outer boroughs.  The standard of review for a government action 
that purportedly violates the Equal Protection Clause is rational basis 
review, meaning that there is no violation if the disparate treatment is 
 
 254. Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 2018) 
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Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 49 (2018)). 
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ultimately linked to a justifiable end (and in this case, that justifiable 
end would be the City Council’s attempt to reduce traffic congestion).  
As a matter of threshold, if the City were to overtly ban all rideshares 
throughout the five boroughs, then potential claimants would have a 
stronger argument. 
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Claims (Title II and 
Title III) 
The ADA is a civil rights law enacted in 1990 prohibiting 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of 
public life including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and 
private places that are open to the general public.259  Disabled riders 
have filed several lawsuits arguing that a lack of accessibility in 
rideshares and taxis violates the ADA. 
Noel v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission is one such 
case providing several guiding principles by which we may understand 
the regulation of the taxi industry — and possibly rideshare — under 
the ADA.260  In 2012, plaintiffs sued the TLC alleging the City’s taxi 
services failed to provide disabled persons with meaningful access to 
transportation, discriminating in violation of the ADA Title II(A).  
But the Second Circuit found that “Title II . . . and its implementing 
regulations prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals only 
by public entities” and do “not go so far as to require public entities 
to impose on private establishments, as a condition of licensure, a 
requirement that they make their facilities physically accessible to 
persons with disabilities.”  In other words, although the TLC 
regulates and controls the taxi industry in New York City, it is not 
required under ADA Title II(A) to “deploy their licensing and 
regulatory authority to mandate that persons who needed wheelchairs 
be afforded meaningful access to taxis.”261 
Title II of the ADA concerns discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities in access to public services, whereas Title III concerns 
public accommodations.  The Noel plaintiffs raised challenges under 
Title II’s public services provision rather than Title III’s public 
accommodations, which taxis traditionally fall under,262 because Title 
 
 259. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009). 
 260. 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 261. Id. at 65.  The Second Circuit noted that “[a]lthough licensing standards are 
covered by [T]itle II, the licensee’s activities themselves are not covered.  An activity 
does not become a ‘program or activity’ of a public entity merely because it is 
licensed by the public entity.” Id. at 70. 
 262. See supra Section II.A.4. 
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III expressly exempts taxi providers from being required to purchase 
or lease “accessible automobiles.”263  Under Title III of the ADA, 
“[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of 
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), 
or operates a place of public accommodation.”264 
The Second Circuit thus used Title III’s exemption to bolster its 
Title II(A) denial: If the TLC were required under Title II(A) to 
ensure that private taxi providers required a sufficient number of 
accessible vehicles, then this requirement would be in tension with the 
ADA’s explicit Title III exemption for taxis.265  However, the Noel 
court did concede that “more such [accessible] taxis would be on the 
streets if the TLC required more of them to be accessible.  But the 
TLC’s failure to use its regulatory authority does not amount to 
discrimination within the meaning of the ADA or its regulations.”266 
In November 2018, plaintiffs filed a class action in the Southern 
District of New York against Lyft for failing to provide wheelchair-
accessible vehicles, thus excluding people with mobility disabilities 
from using their service in Lowell v. Lyft, Inc..267  To state a claim for 
relief under Title III, a plaintiff must show: (1) he or she is disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendants own, lease, or 
operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) the defendants 
discriminated against the plaintiff by denying them a full and equal 
opportunity to enjoy the defendant’s services.268  The Lowell 
plaintiffs are suing Lyft, a rideshare company, directly under Title III 
claims, and Title III explicitly exempts taxis.  FHVs are not explicitly 
written into Title III — yet — so, as a result, the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss was denied.  However, Lowell (pending in court) has yet to 
 
 263. 49 C.F.R. § 37.29(b). 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
 265. Noel, 687 F.3d at 73–74. (“If the TLC is required under Title II(A) to ensure 
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determine whether a rideshare is a “public accommodation” under 
Title III.269 
A recent case from the Northern District of Illinois, Access Living 
of Metropolitan Chicago. v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,270 evaluated 
whether rideshares like Uber were in fact places of “public 
accommodation” based on whether the vehicles were a real, physical 
space.271  The Court noted that, “the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits agree with Uber that a place of public accommodation must 
be a physical space.”272  The First Circuit, in Carparts Distribution 
Center, Inc. v. Automobile Wholesaler’s Association of New 
England, Inc.,273 however, concluded otherwise.274 The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that the terms listed in section 12181(7) of the ADA are not 
only physical places and might encompass, for example, a travel 
service that conducts its “business by telephone or correspondence” 
because “[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter 
an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons 
who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are 
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 272. Access Living of Metro. Chicago, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1154–55. 
 273. 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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made available to those who do not have disabilities.”). 
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not.”275  The Seventh Circuit has also has seemingly followed the First 
Circuit, noting 
that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s 
office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in 
physical space or in electronic space) that is open to the public 
cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once 
in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled 
do.276 
Access Living, falling under the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit, 
held that Uber was indeed a place of public accommodation because 
it does not have to be a physical space. While the Second Circuit has 
cited Carparts approvingly, it has not definitively agreed with the 
Caparts position.277 
How the Second Circuit resolves whether FHVs are public 
accommodations could determine the extent to which companies like 
Uber and Lyft are liable under the ADA and other laws engaging 
“public accommodations” (like the New York City Human Rights 
Law, set forth below).  In Noel, the Court’s interpretation of Title 
III’s exclusion of taxis was also understood in the context of Title II 
— which protects qualified individuals with disabilities from 
discrimination on the basis of disability in services, programs, and 
activities provided by State and local government entities.  Thus, if 
FHVs possibly are classified as a “public accommodation,” it could 
open a local government up to liability under Title II as well.  As in 
civil rights claims against state and local governments,278 plaintiffs 
could attempt to sue the TLC directly, but a court would probably 
need to construe rideshares as a service provided by the state or local 
government itself as a type of “public transportation,” at which time it 
is not. 
However, this is a fine line of interpretation; to classify FHVs as a 
public accommodation, but not as public transportation (as taxis are) 
under the ADA would be consistent with the theory that from a 
regulatory perspective, FHVs and taxis are justifiably distinct.279  The 
distinction is also not as clear-cut as it may seem, since Ubers operate 
in virtually the same market as taxis do.  Depending on how 
companies expand and develop in the future, the gap between FHVs’ 
 
 275. Id. 
 276. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19). 
 277. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 278. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 279. See supra Section I.B. 
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private-public existence may be closed.  As companies like Uber and 
Lyft go public this year, and expand their services to operate more 
consistently and seamlessly with that of public transit, courts may 
start to look at rideshares from the perspective that not only are they 
places of public accommodations, but that they step over the line into 
“public transportation” territory. 
5. New York City Human Rights Laws 
New York City has its own civil rights laws called the New York 
City Human Rights Laws (“NYCHRL”), which prohibit a public 
accommodation from withholding or refusing to provide full and 
equal enjoyment of goods or services based on the following 
protected classes: race, color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or 
citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, 
partnership status, caregiver status, uniformed service, any lawful 
source of income, status as a victim of domestic violence or status as a 
victim of sex offenses or stalking, whether children are, may be or 
would be residing with a person or conviction or arrest record.280  
Furthermore, any prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination, bias-
related violence, or harassment and disorder threatens the rights and 
privileges of the City’s inhabitants and is a menace the institutions 
and foundation of a free democratic state.281  The Human Rights Law 
thus grants agency authority to eliminate and prevent discrimination 
from playing any role in actions relating to public accommodations, 
not to mention housing and other real estate, and employment. 
The argument can be made that taxis and rideshares are a type of 
“public accommodation” in light of a broad reading of Title III of the 
ADA, whose definition for “public accommodation” is more 
comprehensive than it is in Title II of the Civil Rights Act.282   Under 
 
 280. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101, 8-402, 8-502 (2019). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Elizabeth Brown, Fare Trade: Reconciling Public Safety and Gender 
Discrimination in Single-Sex Ridesharing, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 394–95 
(2017).  Brown argues that “legislative and judicial exceptions should be made for 
women-only transportation services, allowing sex-based distinctions in both hiring 
drivers and accommodating riders, because the social value of public safety outweighs 
the interest of gender equality in this unique context.  Single-sex rideshare companies 
should be permitted to engage in gender discrimination when they can demonstrate 
that the purpose and effect of such discrimination is to improve public safety.” Id. at 
368.  Insofar as rideshares are a “public accommodation” pursuant to Title VI and 
ADA, single-sex ridesharing should be exempted from state public accommodation 
law because the “public” connotation does not apply to ridesharing per se. Id. at 395.  
“Ridesharing is a unique form of public accommodation because, unlike riding a train 
or bus, it involves inviting a customer into the driver’s own car . . . . Ridesharing is 
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the ADA, discrimination is prohibited in “specified public 
transportation,” which is defined as “bus, rail, or any other 
conveyance . . . that provides the general public with general or 
special service . . . on a regular and continuing basis.”283  Limiting 
access to rideshares in the outer boroughs will be severely hindered if 
a permanent cap were to be implemented by the TLC.  With 
substantial evidence that these negative outcomes will occur, and 
guided by potential ADA understanding of “public 
accommodations,” aggrieved plaintiffs may be able to contemplate 
NYCHLR claims that the TLC denies access to rideshares as public 
accommodations. 
B. Int. No. 144-B May Be Preempted by State Law 
Fundamentally, the City Council may not have the authority to 
grant the TLC the power to permanently limit the number of 
rideshares.  While state law grants all municipalities the authority to 
limit taxicabs, only in two other counties does it expressly expand this 
limitation to vehicles other than taxis, and nowhere to vehicles that 
are for-hire.   
1. State Law Grants No Municipality the Power to Limit TNC 
Vehicles 
In passing the new law capping the number of FHVs for one year, 
first, the City Council amended the New York City administrative 
code to reflect the addition of a study to be conducted by the 
Commission of the impact of for-hire vehicles in the City, called the 
“vehicle utilization standard.”  Second, the Council authorized the 
commission to establish and revise these standards for high-volume 
for-hire services, and to regulate the number of FHV licenses. 
Under Section 2302(a) of the New York City Charter, the 
Commission has broad authority to regulate and supervise “the 
business and industry of transportation of persons by licensed vehicles 
for hire in the city.”  This authority includes licensing of taxis and 
FHV drivers and owners and the setting of standards for their 
conduct.  But Int. No. 144-B has extended the commission’s authority 
over rideshares like never before.  Whether this extension of the 
 
even more private than a taxi.  The privately-owned cars rarely have the kind of 
structural dividers between the front and back seats, intercoms, or diverting video 
screens usually found in taxis.” Id. at 395. 
 283. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) (2012). 
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commission’s power to regulate the issuance of new licenses to for-
hire vehicles by imposing a limit, or cap, on them, is open to question. 
While New York City has express authority to “limit the number of 
taxicabs to be licensed,” it does not have express authority to limit the 
number of FHVs, and in only two counties has this limiting authority 
been expanded to other vehicles (none of which are FHVs).284  Under 
New York State law, municipalities have the authority to adopt 
ordinances regulating the registration and licensing of taxis 
registration, and municipalities may limit the number of taxicabs to be 
licensed.285  Furthermore, section 181 of New York General 
Municipal Laws, an ordinance regulating taxicabs and limousines, 
states that Westchester county may limit the number of taxicabs and 
limousines to be licensed, while Rockland county may limit the 
number of taxicabs, limousines, and livery vehicles to be licensed.286  
The counties of Nassau, Suffolk, Dutchess, and Ulster, in comparison, 
are not expressly granted this authority, even though Nassau, like 
Westchester, may adopt ordinances regulating the registration of 
taxicabs and limousines, and Suffolk, Dutchess, and Ulster, like 
Rockland, may adopt local laws or ordinances regulating the 
registration of taxicabs, limousines, and livery vehicles.287  In other 
words, all cities, villages, and towns in New York may limit the 
number of licensed taxis, and only in two counties — Westchester and 
Rockland —may licensed limousines also be limited (with Rockland 
being the sole county authorized to limit livery vehicles as well). 
Since the introduction of rideshares into the City, section 181 has 
been amended in 2012 (adding the counties of Suffolk and Rockland), 
2015 (adding language for “local laws”), and 2016 (adding the 
counties of Dutchess and Ulster).  Again, this legislative history 
shows that distinctions were made regarding whether a county may 
limit certain types of vehicles, with no mention ever being made of 
FHVs.  The municipal general law’s silence as to limiting FHVs is not 
 
 284. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 181 (McKinney 2016). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id.; see In re Melrose Credit Union v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.S.3d 579, 579 
(App. Div. 2018) (noting the differences between the three types of vehicles available 
to passengers for hire in New York are “(1) yellow medallion taxicabs; (2) Street Hail 
Liveries, which are green taxicabs; and (3) for-hire vehicles”).  “FHVs include livery 
cars, luxury limousines, and “black cars,” which are FHVs that are “dispatched from 
a central facility . . . , where such central facility has certified to the satisfaction of the 
[TLC] that more than ninety percent of the central facility’s for-hire business is on a 
payment basis other than direct cash payment by a passenger.” Id. (citing N.Y.C. 
ADMIN CODE § 19-502[u]). 
 287. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 181(McKinney 2016). 
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for the state legislature’s lack of trying or contemplation.  In the 
2015–2016 session, Senate Bill S3538 was introduced in order to 
clarify section 181(1).  The original bill as proposed read that 
ordinances may regulate “[t]he registration and licensing of taxicabs, 
limousines, and livery vehicles and may limit the number of taxicabs, 
limousines, and livery vehicles to be licensed.”288  The legislature 
could have included “transportation network company vehicles” in 
the list of vehicles municipalities could limit but did not. 
Regardless, the amended version of this bill (Senate Bill S3538B), 
which ultimately passed the Senate and was vetoed by the Governor, 
was changed to remove the latter amendment that would have added 
“limousines, and livery vehicles” to vehicles that could be limited in 
number.  In other words, while the legislature may have initially 
attempted to authorize municipalities to cap the number of 
limousines and livery vehicles, they expressly removed it in later 
amendments, effectively keeping taxicabs as the only type of vehicle 
that may be capped. 
In 2017, New York State passed the TNC Act, which greenlit TNC 
operation throughout the state and explicitly excluded New York City 
taxicabs and FHVs — over which the New York City Taxi & 
Limousine Commission (the “Commission”) already had existing 
authority.289  As the law states, “[t]he purpose of this act is to ensure 
the safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of transportation network 
company (TNC) services within the state of New York and to 
preserve and enhance access to these important transportation 
options for residents and visitors to the state.”290  In enacting a 
regulatory regime for the state, the legislature proved its awareness of 
Section 181, by adding the new regulations to Section 182 (local 
regulation of transportation network companies) and had the power 
and opportunity to expressly allow municipalities to limit the number 
of TNC vehicles.  But instead, Section 182 provides counties and cities 
with populations over 100,000 the authority to “prohibit the pick-up 
of any person by a transportation network company . . . within their 
geographic boundaries pursuant to the enactment of a local law or 
 
 288. S. 03538, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016). 
 289. N.Y. VEH. & TRAFF. LAW § 1691(1) (McKinney 2017); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 
182 (McKinney 2016).  The law, included in the 2018 state budget, was signed by 
Governor Andrew Cuomo on April 10, 2017.  It authorizes any county, or a city with 
a population of more than 100,000, to prohibit the pick-up of a person by a TNC 
within the bounds of the jurisdiction (none of which have done so). S. Res 2009C, 
2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
 290. S. Res. 1264, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
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ordinance,”291 again, making no mention of “limiting” TNC vehicles, 
as it does with taxicabs in Section 181. 
2. What Authority Does the TLC Have?   
The City Council, aligned with its broad constitutional home rule 
powers conferred on local government, has “in addition to all 
enumerated powers,” broad authority to: 
adopt local laws which it deems appropriate, which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this charter or with the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or this state, for the good 
rule and government of the city; for the order, protection and 
government of persons and property; for the preservation of the 
public health, comfort, peace and prosperity of the city and its 
inhabitants; and to effectuate the purposes and provisions of this 
charter or of the other law relating to the city.292 
As a City agency, the TLC has broad authority under the New 
York City charter and administrative code to promulgate rules and 
regulations that supervise, regulate, and control for-hire vehicles in 
the City.293  Title 35 of the Rules of the City of New York similarly 
provides that, “[t]o promote public comfort and convenience, and 
taking into account the overall public transportation network of the 
City, the [TLC] will establish an overall public transportation policy 
governing for-hire transportation services in the City, including taxi, 
limousine, paratransit and commuter van services.”294  Thus, the TLC 
has broad authority to implement stand-alone regulations and 
regulatory schemes related to the taxi industry.295 
Furthermore, in In re Melrose Credit Union v. City of New 
York,296 the Court elaborated that the TLC’s authority included the 
power to adopt “E-Hail” and “FHV E-Dispatch” rules for rideshares 
like Ubers, which “establish regulations for E-Hail and E-Payment 
that will encourage innovation, provide desired services to taxi 
 
 291. N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 182 (McKinney 2016).  Additionally, the law added 
other provisions regarding licensing, driver background checks (but, controversially, 
not fingerprinting), required disclosure to passengers, and insurance. Id. 
 292. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 28 (2019). 
 293. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-501 (2019); N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2300. 
 294. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 52-01. 
 295. N.Y.C. Comm. for Taxi Safety v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 681 
N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that the City Charter delegates the 
Commission a “broad grant of authority . . . to promulgate and implement a 
pervasive regulatory program for the taxicab industry, including . . . requirements for 
the maintenance of financial security”). 
 296. 76 N.Y.S.3d 579 (App. Div. 2018). 
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passengers, promote safety and consumer protection, and create 
income opportunities for drivers.”297  The goal of the E-Hail Rules is 
to “accommodate new technology into the taxi industry while taking 
into account the needs of E-Hail application developers, drivers, 
vehicle owners and passengers.”298  This ruling narrowly explained 
the TLC’s authority with respect to regulations regarding rideshare 
vehicles. 
3. Preemption? 
New York State can indicate its intent to preempt an area of law 
either by express statutory language, clearly indicating it has 
preempted the field, or by implication.299  While no specific 
preemption language is involved in the matter here, preemption may 
be inferred if the state establishes a “comprehensive and detailed 
regulatory scheme.”300  Uber argues the latter point, pointing to the 
State’s Fix NYC Advisory Panel Report.301  In establishing the Fix 
NYC Advisory Panel Report, the State may have implicitly 
preempted the City from making rules pertaining to capping 
rideshares because the report urges consideration of reducing the 
rates for rideshare carpools, and implementation of a congestion 
pricing surcharge on FHVs, with the revenues going towards MTA 
improvement.302  Ultimately, legislation that imposes caps on the 
number of for-hire vehicles that can operate in the congestion zone 
could depress anticipated revenues the MTA would receive through 
the surcharge on for-hire vehicles.303 
There are many reasons why the preemption argument is valid with 
respect to the new law.  At one time, the state contemplated, then 
withdrew, an amendment to the law that would give municipalities 
authority to limit TNCs.  The state also created an aspirational, state-
wide regulatory plan wherein rideshare vehicles play an integral role 
in not just decreasing congestion but raising revenue for the MTA.  
 
 297. Id. at 584. 
 298. Id. 
 299. McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 965 N.Y.S.2d 811, 815 (Sup. Ct. 
2013), aff’d, McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 985 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 
2014). 
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 301. See generally FIX NYC ADVISORY PANEL, FIX NYC ADVISORY PANEL 
REPORT (2018), http://www.hntb.com/hntb/media/hntbmedialibrary/home/fix-nyc-
panel-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB96-XPQB]. 
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 303. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 10. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 
Lastly, as a policy matter, a law of this sort is not merely local in 
character, but national (and perhaps even international). 
What is most troubling here is that local legislators have given 
broad authority to the TLC to regulate FHVs in a way that the state 
legislature has done only narrowly, and in a way that no other city — 
big or small — has done before.  Simply put, municipal legislators 
invariably have the authority to adopt certain taxi and rideshare 
vehicle regulations because it impacts the health and safety of the 
City’s citizens.304  But the threshold of their power to regulate is not 
unlimited.  It must be beyond the scope of a city council, even one as 
large and powerful as New York City’s, to delegate to an agency the 
authority to limit the growth of a company, where the state has not 
explicitly granted them that power, and especially more so in an area 
where this practice is unprecedented.  The manner and form of 
rideshare regulations — from licensing and background checks — is 
within the scope of local authority.  As a threshold question, where a 
municipality’s right to ban rideshares is expressly delegated, the right 
to arbitrarily cap rideshare licenses is not symmetrically defined and 
therefore cannot be assumed. 
Before the rise of rideshares, no other type of vehicle, except taxis, 
was permitted to pick up passengers right off the street.  And the 
many instances of black livery cars being fined for attempting to pick 
up street hails in the outer boroughs underscores even further how 
Uber and other rideshare vehicles has filled a gap.  But this 
phenomenon does not make ridesharing a local problem, or solution, 
depending on which side of the table one sits.  Limiting rideshares 
with a permanent cap is not within the authority of a city and should 
not be under the authority of a city because it is part of a larger 
industry.  There is no turning back the clock and disassembling the 
entire rideshare industry; the sharing economy is here to stay. 
III. RETHINKING RIDESHARE REGULATION 
Section III.A. first proposes that legislators of major cities not seek 
to impose strict regulations like a permanent capping mechanism on 
rideshare vehicles.  Second, Section III.B. advances alternatives to a 
 
 304. G&C Transp., Inc. v. McGrane, 928 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (“N.Y. 
Gen. Mun. Law § 181 did not preempt a municipality’s authority to adopt taxicab 
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regulations that were consistent with state law, and (2) N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 
2(c)(ii)(10) and N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) conferred broad police 
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blanket cap on rideshares, such as congestion pricing (that contains a 
poverty exemption) and providing subsidies for rides. 
Regulators should ultimately embrace, rather than impede, the 
innovative aspects of FHVs as a way to expand access to low-income, 
minority, and disabled residents, instead of imposing regulatory 
schemes that are proven to aggravate disparities in transit equity.  
Rideshares like Ubers are distinct from taxis, even from a legal 
standpoint, and so they deserve different regulations and protections. 
A. Avoid Overly Strict Regulations 
For various reasons, the market will, for better or for worse, self-
regulate, deeming a cap not just draconian, but unnecessary.  Uber 
has finally gone public, and only time will tell if the company can 
overcome its lackluster debut and start to turn a profit — especially if 
autonomous, driverless vehicles are the future.305  A portion of the 
company’s losses are on account of subsidized rides, so for the 
company to begin creating a profit, the cost of rideshares will likely go 
up.  A permanent cap on rideshares would further raise prices and 
disproportionately impact low-income and minority riders.  
Ultimately, capping rideshares is a counterproductive regulatory 
scheme and sends an overly restrictive message against innovative 
new companies and industries that are adapting to technological 
changes and societal needs. 
B. Alternatives to Capping Rideshares 
1. Utilize Rideshares Alongside Public Transit 
New York City should consider merging private rideshares with 
public transportation because this will improve residents’ quality of 
life by creating multiple accessible transit options.  For example, one 
opportunity for City officials to capitalize on ridesharing is by 
providing first and last mile travel subsidies, or subsidies that cover 
rides to and from popular transit hubs in the outer boroughs, which 
would encourage rides to destinations outside the typical transit zone 
or underserved by public transit.  For example, in 2016, Pinellas 
Suncoast Transit Authority in St. Petersburg, Florida, became the 
first agency in the country to subsidize Uber trips.306  The Authority 
 
 305. See Hawkins, supra note 49. 
 306. See Laura Bliss, Where Ride-Hailing and Transit Go Hand in Hand, CITYLAB 
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/08/where-ride-hailing-
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gave $5.00 discounts on Uber and Lyft rides, as well on rides provided 
by a local taxi company, to and from twenty-four popular bus stops in 
its service area to as many as 1000 riders per month.307 
And since 2016, at least twenty-seven more communities across the 
United States (including Los Angeles and Marin, California; Denver, 
Colorado; Detroit, Michigan; Portland, Oregon; Boston, 
Massachusetts; Washington, D.C.; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) 
have partnered with Uber, Lyft, and other rideshare companies “to 
supplement or substitute traditional service.”308  The Denver suburb 
of Centennial, Colorado provided free Lyft trips to light rail 
stations,309 while in Washington, D.C., the fire and EMS department 
is exploring ways to contract Uber to transport non-emergency 911 
callers.310 
At the very least for ADA passengers, a partnership between 
public transit and private rideshares would be incredibly more cost-
efficient than current paratransit systems in place.311  In Boston, The 
Ride (a door-to-door transportation service for residents who are 
disabled and elderly) costs $31.00 per ride and has a budget of over 
$100 million a year; but under a program between the Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority and rideshare companies like Uber 
and Lyft, every Uber and Lyft ride will cost the agency $13.00 per 
ride.312 
With both Uber and Lyft now expanding their businesses into 
scooters and bikes, incorporating a more seamless and integrated 
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rideshare system (between traditional public transit, rideshare 
vehicles, bikes, and scooters) is even more easily foreseeable.  
Partnering with Uber and Lyft would also allow New York transit 
agencies to complement public transit at a time when transit ridership 
is on the decline due to inadequate, inefficient, and overcrowded 
system that underserves a significant portion of the City’s population.  
There is great demand to improve transit infrastructure, and linking 
on-demand transportation with traditional transit services could be a 
way to increase ridership while providing reliable service to all riders 
especially those in transit deserts, areas plagued by poor transit 
options. 
2. Implement Congestion Pricing 
Now that congestion pricing for Manhattan’s central business 
district, or the geographical area below 60th street, was officially 
passed in New York City on April 1, 2019, the City — the first to 
implement such pricing — should take care devising a hardship 
exemption.313  Congestion pricing will include surcharging rides in 
zones where transit is most plentiful and reliable and congestion costs 
are highest while charging little or nothing else for rides elsewhere, 
where these conditions are reversed.314  In addition to reducing 
traffic, congestion pricing will raise funds that could be allocated to 
the MTA.  Using data like pick-up and drop-off information for 
rideshares and taxis could help regulators identify which areas are 
most congested and therefore which areas require congestion fees.315  
Moreover, Uber supports congestion pricing in Manhattan as long as 
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the pricing applies to all vehicles.316  Congestion pricing has been 
imposed on traffic in the busy central business districts of other major 
cities,317 including London, where congestion pricing successfully 
reduced private car use 39% between 2002 and 2014.318 
Ironically, when Mayor de Blasio criticized congestion pricing 
proposals back in 2017, he did so because he asserted it would be a 
burden on outer-borough residents.319  In actuality, only 4% of 
employed outer-borough residents — about 118,000 — commute to 
work in Manhattan by car, and only 2% of those who do — about 
5000 — are considered to be poor, or living under the federal poverty 
limit.320 
Schaller reports that “[a] multi-pronged strategy that is anchored 
around a comprehensive congestion pricing plan that charges all 
vehicles entering the central business district below 60th Street in 
Manhattan is far more likely to produce positive results than 
imposing artificial caps on FHVs.”321  Rather than replicate the taxi 
medallion system, which imposes a numerical cap and leads “to 
artificial inflation of medallion values and economic distress,” 
Schaller supports implementing a congestion pricing plan that “would 
impose fees on drivers of personal, commercial, and for-hire 
vehicles.”322  These fees could then be used to raise revenue to fix, 
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improve, and maintain public transit, which Schaller argues is  the 
“most equitable form of transportation in New York City.”323    
CONCLUSION 
New York City would not be promulgating an effective or legal 
regulation by enacting a permanent cap on the number of rideshares 
in the City.  Such a limit exacerbates existing problems of transit 
inequality, especially for outer borough residents.  City council 
members, transit experts and advocates, and rideshare companies 
recognize the disparate impact and discriminatory externalities that a 
cap on FHVs would impose on riders living in the outer boroughs and 
any community that suffers from inadequate access to transportation.  
While it is essential for the New York City Council and the City’s 
TLC to prioritize the more significant and systemic public transit 
issues, these entities should also recognize that FHVs are an 
invaluable supplement to the public transit system, particularly for 
the low-income and minority riders living outside of Manhattan.  
FHVs are offering transportation options to the most underserved 
members of New York City’s population and fill a key gap created by 
an underinvested and discriminatory transit system.  Limitations on 
FHVs simply cause too great of a disparate impact on the City’s most 
vulnerable residents. 
Underlying the potentially discriminatory impact of a rideshare cap 
is the more significant, national issue of unequal access to public 
transit.  As asserted by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Title VI Legal Manual, social psychological 
research proves that implicit bias against people of color continues to 
be a widespread problem.324  From an inequality perspective, there 
are greater implications from capping Uber regarding equal access to 
transportation insofar that it stifles innovation rather than producing 
potential solutions.  Better public transit could result if local 
governments were to embrace technological innovations as positive 
transportation opportunities.  Uber and other rideshares could be a 
keystone for this transportation puzzle, and may not merely mitigate 
transit inequality in the outer boroughs but instead solve these 
greater transit inequality issues.  It would be unjust for policymakers 
in New York to sideline the concerns of outer borough residents by 
implementing a scheme that will ultimately harm disadvantaged 
populations. 
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Rather than extend this one-year moratorium, the City should 
focus its efforts on enforcing taxes for drivers in congested zones.  
This will better address the undeniable problems of traffic congestion 
in New York City without removing a vital transit service from the 
City’s most marginalized residents. 
Rideshare platforms are an undeniable part of the fabric of urban 
life.  They have not only changed the transportation landscape by 
providing on-demand car service; they have the potential to operate 
in a more integrated manner with public transit and provide 
substantially more access to transit and help residents in every area of 
the five boroughs escape the transit desert.  Instead of banning these 
valuable services, cities should work with these companies to offer 
better transit for all. 
 
